University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1929

Identification of the Holder and Tender of Receipt
on the Counter-Presentation of Checks
Samuel Klaus

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Klaus, Samuel, "Identification of the Holder and Tender of Receipt on the Counter-Presentation of Checks" (1929). Minnesota Law
Review. 2298.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/2298

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

MINNESOTA

LAW REVIEW
Journal of the State Bar Assoczaon
MARCH, 1929

VOLUME 13

No. 4

IDENTIFICATION OF THE HOLDER AND TENDER OF
RECEIPT ON THE COUNTER-PRESENTATION
OF -CHECKS
By

SAMUEL KLAUS*

reader of this article will find it concerned with this
question, with what measure of impunity may a commercial
bank on which a customer has drawn a check refuse to pay the
check unless the holder is identified and receipt of payment offered? The reader will note that this question thus put excludes
consideration of presentment by methods other than over the
counter. Consideration, then, is limited to a relatively small number of transactions taken in the aggregate, by far most checks
drawn on banks in this country are presented either through the
clearing house or by mail.1 In clearing house and mail presentations the paying bank has the assurance of moral responsibility
and, usually, the solvency of a presenting bank that is known, that
is easily reached and that cannot afford-under pain of reciprocation-to evade indemnification, payment is often solely by book
transfers, and when the presenting bank is not a holder, it usually
expressly guarantees indorsements, and it always gives a receipt
necessarily, because for its own good it indicates on the check that
it is the presenter to whom payment is to be made and often to whom
HE

*Of the Bar of New York City.

'No figures or estimates appear to be available. An official of the
New York Clearing House has hazarded the guess to the writer that

no less than 99% of checks presented are presented through the clearing house in New York City. This may be, perhaps, rather figurative
than an attempt at accuracy. Of course, it is highly probable that in
a particular bank the ratio between counter presentations and mail or
clearing house presentations may be different from that in another
bank. Mere preponderance in number does not indicate preponderance of practical importance. Nevertheless it must be an uncommon
community, taken by and large, in which counter presentations arc
at least nearly as frequent as presentation in the other modes. It will
be noted that even in communities where banks are few a very large
proportion of checks would be deposited by customers for credit;
to a considerable extent problems of identifiedtion and receipt are fewer.
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pavinent has been made (by way of anticipation)
Moreover it
seems to be true that as a practical matter drawee banks do re
quire identification and execution of a receipt, and they do manage to receive both in the particular forms in which they, the bank,
desire to receive them.2 The reader of this article may thus conclude that, speaking practically, the question with which it is concerned is of an importance far from tremendous. Such a conclusion is proper. Yet the question has given no small amount oi
trouble to theoretically minded persons. 3 Is not this a sufficient
reason for an article?
In limine, let it be said that the relevance of the data which
will be gathered together for examination will be determined and the
data selected will be arranged in accordance with their significance
in aiding us to fix or prognosticate their potency in the regulation of the conduct of banks and customers to each other by the
force of judicial decision. For this reason, it must be admitted.
the approach is essentially non-normal since litigation is apt to
be non-normal and the occasion for litigation is almost always a
non-normal one. Human inter-relations are in the largest part
necessarily self-regulating and differences are settled by self-adjustment. To repeat a point not infrequently made, it may be
that for litigational purposes not the requirements of the normal
but precisely those of the non-normal situation should be considered as most persuasive. Concretely, the judicial rules as to
identification and receipt should be determined according to the
requirements of times of panic, when counter-presentations are
most frequent, or according to the requirements of country banks
rather than city banks. The precise circumstances of the case at
bar, whatever they be, should for administrative reasons be ignored. But it is conceived that there does not seem to be any
sufficient ground for making a distinction here between the normal and the non-normal situations.4
2As will be demonstrated later.
3
See, e.g., Llewellyn, Supervening Impossibility of Performing
Conditions in the Law of Negotiable Paper, 23 Col. L. Rev. 142, 145
et seq., 1 Morse, Banks and Banking 5th ed., 701 56 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 122, Brannan, Review of fifth edition of Dianiel on Negotiable
Instruments, 17 Harv. L. Rev. 580" 2 Paton, Digest of Legal Opinions, secs. 2829a, 2831a; 33 Banking L. J. 160.
The problem may be less important in the identification aspect in
England and elsewhere where there is a legal sanction to crossed
cheques
and payments on forged indorsements. See infra, note 77
4
Another approach would be to study comparatively the content
of all the existing contrQls-the control exercised by the courts of
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Of course, as is obvious, we shall deal in reality with two distinct questions one, of identification, two, of receipt. But the
sequel will show that these questions are bound to each other by
common considerations. And also, they have a dramatic kinship.
For when a check is presented over the counter, the teller will
want to know whether the person demanding payment is the person who by the terms of the check is entitled to receive payment,
and then he will want a sufficient memorial of the fact that payment was made to tlus person.' It is likewise obvious that in
dealing with the questions raised, two decisions have to be made.
The first is, what standard pattern of conduct on the part of
banks do we desire to set up. The second is, what are the sanctions, legal or non-legal, direct or indirect, which under all the
circumstances it is best to impose in order to enforce the standard
chosen.
Now, the layman (legalistically unsophisticated) would probably reason in tlus wise. If, as is the fact, the bank will not be
privileged to debit the customer's account (that is, acquire a claim
against the customer for reimbursement or reduce the scope of
its obligation to him) in case it should turn out that the person to
whom the bank makes payment is not the person designated by the
customer to receive payment, is it not only common decency to permit the bank to make payment conditional on identification? And is
it not but fair that the bank shall have some sort of written evidence that the holder has received payment? For, conceding that
the bank need not pay unless the holder surrenders the check, the
bank still does not prove, prima facie, payment to the holder in
an action by the bank against the holder merely by profert of the
check. Whether such common decency and such fairness have
been or may be expected to be motivating factors in legal decisions, is the subject to which we turn.
law, that exercised by banks and that exercised by others, if there be

any others. The result might be .used for the evaluation of the efficiency actual or potential of any one of the controls.
6It would not be infrequent for the problems discussed to be called
problems in the performance of conditions. In that sense, the word
"condition" would be a symbol, in addition, for the necessity that
a check be exhibited to the drawee, that payment be demanded, that
the exhibition and demand be at a proper time and at a proper place.
The use of the word "condition" is then merely a convenient and
rather crude manifestation of an attempt to classify events subsequent
to delivery of the check and precedent to payment. In an accurate
sense it would be difficult to distinguish other contingencies, as, for
example, that the check be drawn. that it be drawn in proper form.
that it be drawn by a customer, that the customer provide a sufficient
credit balance and so on.
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THE RELEVANCE OF THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW AND
THE LAW OF BILLS AND NOTES

At the outset we must-as is usual-consider the relevance of
the Negotiable Instruments Law or the so-called law of bills and
notes. Strictly, that statute and that law would seem ot no relevance. For there is no question here as to claims "on the instrument" between parties to it, the Negotiable Instruments Law does
not purport to regulate any other relations.
In a broad sense,
however, it may be that the statute and that law have application.
The argument in favor of such application must be that when the
holder presents for payment the bank has to decide whether or
not it will pay The drawee's order, it would be argued, is as it
purports to be, unconditional, it is not pay John Jones if he gives
you a receipt and if he identifies himself.' At the utmost, this
argument includes a concession that the bank might be permitted
sufficient time to examine the check for genuineness and formal
propriety and to examine the state of the drawer's account, and
that during this time it might investigate the holder's title.' But
the concession would include no more. If, then, (the argument
would proceed) the bank demands and the holder refuses performance of other conditions than presentment as described by
the Negotiable Instruments Law or the rules of bills and notes, the
check is dishonored in the sense that recourse against prior parties,
oThis must be true of the statute as a whole, although undiscriminating persons seem often to think that if a check is involved in
a transaction the Negotiable Instruments Law must govern. Occasionally there may be a section which, because of phraseology, appears to
be applicable. Section 87, for instance, says that "where the instrument
is made payable at a bank it is equivalent to an order to the bank to
pay the same for the account of the principal debtor thereon." An
examination of the cases before and after the drafting of the statute
will show that almost all the cases in which this section might have
been applicable involved parties to the instrument and did not involve
either the duty of the bank to pay or its privilege to debit on payment
an acceptance or note domiciled with it. We simply have another example of the sort of draftsmanship which states rules in the form of
exhortation rather than of consequence. The advocate, nevertheless,
will always rely on such draftsmanship for suggestive material to
add weight to an argument.
7
Logically, the order as the bank receives it need not be the same as
the order as the holder supposes it to be. The relations between
the bank and the drawer might make the order conditional on all sorts
of events not stated in the check. The rules as to formal requisites in
the law of bills and notes apply, it would seem, solely to the literal
wording of the written order.
8That is to say since the bank might take the time to do the one,
nobo'dy is harmed if it also does the other, so long as no more time
is expended. See infra, p. 288.
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among them the drawer, accrues. In fine, if the drawer may be
charged it must be that the drawee has defaulted.
This argument may be said to be based on the fallacy of four
terms. That is to say, it does not follow that the "dishonor"
which conditions recourse is the same "dishonor" which imposes
a duty on the bank to respond in damages to the drawer-customer
for breach of duity to honor." In short, it may be said that to
the extent that the liability of bank to customer is under examination we must look to the contract between the bank and the
customer. True, advancing such a counter-argument is merely
answering formalism by formalism,10 but it does prove the absence of a logical barrier. And since traditional logic does not
bar us from further investagation,1 ' desire for a more adequate
treatment compels us to consider whether in fact the drawer
would be charged by failure of the drawee to pay If he would,
then we have. a cogent reason, though not a conclusive or a convincing one, for charging the drawee with default to the drawer.
At the present juncture, however, all that need be said is that
whatever considerations of convenience or of policy justify the
imposition of conditions of identification and receipt as between
bank and customer will be applicable mutatis mutandis between
holder and prior parties. 2 Garments of words in which to clothe
the result are easily found.
We may likewise dispose of the argument made by a reputable authority that a banker refuses to honor at his peril, though
gThis would follow in situations suggested in note 7 supra.
For example, in addition, see the discussion in Whitaker v. Bank of
England, (1835) 1 C. M. & R. 744, where the court distinguishes between a formal presentment by a notary necessary to charge the
drawer, though made after banking hours, and presentment which is
not sufficient to charge the bank betause made after banking hours.
10 Our traditional intention of the parties formula purports to require
evidence of a prior consensual arrangement which is merely effectuated
by the forces of political government. But in banker-customer relations the traditionalist grows uneasy in attempting to fix the contract;
the hoary formula tends to compel the, fixation of a historical point at
which the "contract was made," and this seems most difficult. Is it
when the account was opened? Is it when the first check was presented? Is it when the check in suit was presented?
"iSuch a logic would not be an insurmountable barrier, but it
would be a serious one. It remains true, the writer thinks, that there
is justification for a non-particularistic disposition of legal situations:
systematization without direct reference to the effect of each rule in
society has its value, although much less value than lawyers have in the
immediate past been willing to give it, if the point has at all occurred
to them.
'"See infra, p. 318.
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the holder refuse to make identification. This authority is none
other than the draftsman of the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882.
In the last edition of Chalmers, Bills of Exchange, there appears
the following
"Holder's Identity.-Under some continental codes, when a bill
is payable specially, and the holder is unknown to the payer, he
is bound to give some proof of identity Nouguier, sec. 896, and
this appears to be the law in the United States.13 In England, it
is conceived that possession is prima facie evidence of identity, 1'
and that if the payer doubts the identity of the person presenting,
or the genuineness of the instrument, he must pay or refuse payment at his ozen risk.'* There is a dictum by Maule, J., that in
such case the payer would be allowed a reasonable time to make
Inquiry' but having regard to the duties of the holder this seems
very questionable. The usual practice is to offer to pay under an
indemnity "
In spite of the fact that this quotation is from an annotation
to sec. 59 of the Bills of Exchange Act which provides that a bi'l
is discharged by payment in clue course, Chalmers could hardly
in seriousness make a distinction in this respect between bills
and checks."7 Taking his argument, therefore, as applicable to
checks, the gist of it seems to be the product of a confusion in
the use of the phrase "prima facie." Undoubtedly, at a trial of
an action a plaintiff can make out his case as a holder by showing possession, but it far from follows that this rule of procedure
is also a rule of substantive law in the sense that it governs conduct other than forensic."' Here again, then, we must face considerations of convenience and policy, for here again there is no
rule of law which binds us.
But we must turn to the decisions. That is to say, to what
extent is further discussion foreclosed by judicial opinion?
-aCiting- "Daniel, Negotiable Instruments, sec. 1618. It certainly
is the practice."
14Citing: cf. Buckeley v. Butler, (1824) 2 B. & C. 37 44, per
Bayley, J.
15
Italics the author's [Ed.].
' 6 Robarts v. Tucker, (1851) 16 2 B. 560, 578; cf. Paget, Banking,
2d ed., p. 43.
17Chalmers, Bills of Exchange, 9th ed., 237
18 He would have to make a distinction based on other considerations than those of statutory construction, that is. On the merits,
there may be room for a distinction between bills and checks-the
writer being sufficiently ignorant of the practice as to bills, will take
the word of Chalmers and Paget as to English practice, but will not
commit himself otherwise. See infra note 77
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THE JUDICIAL DEcisioNs

IDENTIFICATION

So far as concerns the problem of identification, discussion is
far from foreclosed. Examination has revealed no decision to
the effect either that a bank is or that it is not in default in its
obligation to its customer if it refuses to pay the customer's check
on the ground that the holder is not sufficiently identified. Except for scattered indications of opinion, little even of dictum has
been found expressly in point.19 The clearest statement " seems to
be that by a lower court in Indiana21 in a case where the question
was whether the bank had paid a check to the payee designated
in the check. The court said :22
"Where a check is presented for payment by a person who is
unknown to the bank, it becomes the imperative duty of the bank
to require him properly to identify himself as the payee named
in the check."
And then it added.
"For its own protection the bank may go further It may refuse payment until the stranger brings in a person whom the
bank knows to be financially responsible and who is willing to
become an indorser."
The last quoted sentence relates to the postlimiary problem
of method of identification we may therefore postpone comment
upon it. It is the first sentence that requires comment at this
juncture. And as to this first sentence, it is to he noted that the
court's language is vague. When the court says that the bank is
under a duty to require an identification, does it mean merely that
the bank had better require one in order to make sure that it will
be privileged to debit the drawer's account? In a legal sense.
such a procedure would be practically without consequence. -3 For
lOChalmers does not offer any other argument than the prima
facie one, and he offers that, it seems in fatalistic resignation; we
therefore need not consider the argument further. But Chalmers'
statement may be less fallacious than it seems when one considers
sec. 60 of the bills of exchange act, 1882. See infra, note 77.
The dictum of Maule, J., referred to, it must be remembered, was
made before the passage of the section which is the ancestor of sec.
60 of the bills of exchange act, 1882. Robarts v. Tucker was decided
in 1851,
20 16 Q. B. 560.
See infra, p, 73.
21
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Reynolds, (1919) 72 Ind. App. 611, 126
N. E.22 234.
Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Reynolds, (1919) 72 Ind. App. 611, 61.5-16.
126 N.
23 E. 234.
Apart from its admissibility in evidence-as to which nothing
is here said-or its effect in being otherwise persuasive without beini.
to use Hohfeld's apt though by no means accurate expression, operative.
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as a rule it would be unimportant how much care was exercised
by the bank in investigating the title of the person paid if he
was not the person designated by the terms of the customer's order,
debit is unavailable.2" Then does the court mean that the bank
is under a legal duty to the customer to require an identification
on the pain of an action for damages" If it does, the statement
is manifestly absurd. On the other hand, if the court means that
the bank is under a necessity to require an identification on pain
of being legally powerless to debit the customer's account, then
the statement is not only absurd but is opposed by considerable
authority that any payment in the course of business at request
is debitable.25 The statement must be taken to mean, in the light
of the succeeding sentence, that the bank may with impunity refuse to pay unless the holder gives satisfactory identification. It
may also mean that recourse against prior parties would not be
available to the holder on his refusal to submit such identification.26 In any event, the inference is fair that the bank would
be privileged to conduct its own investigation intb the holder's
title, if the conduct of the investigation be reasonable.
THE JUDICIAL DECISIONs

RECEIPT

When we come to the problem of receipt we find judicial
authority somewhat more abundant. This authority may be divided into actions by customer against bank for dishonor and
statements made ratione decidendi in actions by holder against
drawer.
The cases involving actions by customer against bank for dishonor are unsatisfactory in the sense that they offer little help
as a basis for statement either of an existing rule in the jurisdictions in which they were decided or of prophecy as to the decision of future cases in those jurisdictions or elsewhere.
Eichner v Bowery Bank,2 7 a case decided by the first department of the appellate division of New York, was an action for
wrongful dishonor of the plaintiff's check presented for pay24This does not mean that the exceptions to the rule are imporIndeed, so far as actual litigation goes. the reported cases on
the question of the customer's care in discovering forgeries, in notitant.

fying the bank and so forth, far outnumber the cases deciding merely
the 2simple
proposition stated in the rule.
5

E.g., Townsend, Oldham & Co. v. Continental State Bank, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1915), 178 S. W 564. Cf. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v.
Bank of Rutherford. (1905) 115 Tenn. 64, 88 S. W 939.
2GSee infra, p. 318.
27(1897) 24 App. Div. 63, 48 N. Y S. 978.
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ment by the payee. In rendering judgment for the bank, on the
s
bank's demurrer to the complaint, the court made this statement .check
was
that
the
"There was no allegation in the complaint
ever mdorsed by the payee either before or at the time or times it
was presented to the bank for payment. So far as the action may
be regarded as one for damages caused by the non-payment of the
check, this latter allegation was a necessary one in the complaint,
and m the absence of such allegation the complaint was defective
and the demurrer properly sustained at Special Term. This precise question was passed upon in the case of Rowley v. National
J
by the general term in this department."
Bank of Deposits2*
If this case be taken to make the tender of a receipt by the
holder a condition to the bank's duty to pay, it must also be taken
to require this receipt to be in the form of the holder's name written in the form of an indorsement. But such an interpretation
is dubious, as is indicated by the court's reliance on the Rowlcy
Case. Rowley v. National Bank of Deposits did not pass upon
this precise question. The report indicates a decision only that
where in an action by a drawer of a check agaiust the bank the
complaint alleges that presentment was made by a bank in which
the payee deposited the check and which credited the amount of
the check to the payee's account, the complaint is demurrable if
it does not-also allege that the payee had indorsed the check. In
fact there was likewise no allegation that the presenting bank had
mdorsed or offered any sort of receipt, and no mention was made
of this fact by the court.30 Furthermore, and more important,
the court in the Eichner Case seems to think of the holder's name
written on the check not merely as a memorial of the receipt of
payment made on the surrender of the check, but as an integration of warranties made as if on a transfer of the check. Yet
there is hardly any statement that is more trite in discussions of
Bills and Notes than that in a surrender to the drawee there do
not attach the warranties that attach on a transfer. The point,
however, need not be labored here. It will receive later notice.
It suffices that the court, it seems, was merely again in that con2
sEichner v. Bowery Bank, (1897) 24 App. Div. 63, 64-65, 48 N.
Y. S. 978.
29(1892) 63 Hun 550, 18 N. Y. S. 545.

30
The Rowley Case thus indicates that a bank is under no duty
to honor unless there is a regular chain of indorsements necessary to

transfer title. See also Goodwin v. Cobe, (1898) 24 Misc. Rep. 389,
53 N. Y. S.415; Integrity Trust Co. v. Lehigh Ave. Bus. Men's B.
& L. Ass'n, (1920) 29 Pa. Dist. 143, (1922) 273 Pa. 416, 116 Ati.
539- cf. Lipton v. Columbia Trust Co., (1920) 194 App. Div. 384,
185 N. Y. S. 198.
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fusion which Brannan and his editor so frequently tell us is so
frequently made. 3'
Another case, decided by a lower Alabama court 32 seems
even more clearly to have indulged in the same error, still another, in a lower court of New York, does not state whether
the presentment was by payee or indorsee and merely states, citing
both the Eichner Case and the Rowley Case, that the complaint
should have alleged that the payee had indorsed.
It is in the few reported opinions rendered in actions by holder against drawer that the receipt problem is at least seen as existent. Here there appear to be altogether three cases citable. One,13
decided in Tennessee, holds (perhaps some people would say,
"says") at the most, that where a check is in the hands of the
drawee bank and it is disputed whether the amount of the check
has been paid the holder, the presumption of payment which arises
on proof that the bank holds the check is rebutted by proof that
the holder's indorsement does not appear on the instrument. The
court seems to consider the indorsement to be the common form of
memorial of receipt of payment. On the other hand, two cases may
be cited as refusing to sanction the demand for a receipt. Indeed,
McCurdy v. The Society of Samngs,34 decided in 1882 by a lower
court of Ohio, was-so the reporter tells us-a test case. Osborn
v Gheen,35 decided barely four years later in the District of Columbia, has been more frequently cited.
In the McCurdy Case the plaintiff was an indorsee under a
blank indorsement from the payee of a check payable to the payee
or order The defendant was the drawer.
"This check," the court says,36 "was duly presented by an
agent of the holder for payment to said City Bank [the drawee],
which then and there had funds of the drawer in its hands, and
the bank refused to pay the same unless the person who presented
it for payment would endorse it. This the holder refused to do
and at once caused the check to be protested for non-payment,
and therefore the plaintiff brought this suit against the Savings
Bank as drawer of the check to test the question."
The court ordered judgment for the plaintiff.
31
Brannan, The Negotiable Instruments Law Annotated 4th ed.
by Prof.
Chafee, 556-563, 618-620.
32
Harden v. Birmingham Trust & Savings Bank, (1911) 1 Ala.
App.3 610, 55 So. 943.
Pickle v. People's Nat'l Bank (also sub nom. Pickle v. Muse),
(1890) 88 Tenn. 380, 12 S. W 919.
34(1882) 6 Ohio Dec. Reprint 1169, 11 Am. L. Rec. 156.
35(1886) 19 D. C. 189.
30(1882) 6 Ohio Dec. 1169, 1170, 11 Am. L. Rec. 156.
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The reasons professed by the court are important for our
purpose. The court limited its discussion to the case in hand.
All that the bank could require would be proof of the genuineness
of the payee's indorsement, and for this purpose a reasonable time
for investigation might be allowed the bank (although as to the
genuineness of the drawer's signature the bank would have to
satisfy itself without the holder's aid). The court suggested that
the bank might be justified in demanding from the holder proof
that the payee's signature was genuine. But as to the holder's
mdorsement the court said 37
cc
it is an attempt to limit the negotiability of such paper,
and to fix terms and conditions for its payment not warranted
by the law or by the drawer of the check, and to which neither
he nor the holder is obliged to submit."
Yet if the court desires to obviate impediments to negotiability that would arise from the imposition of conditions, it is
difficult to see why proof of custom of banks to require and to
receive such receipt-indorsement would not be relevant as indicating actual practice.38 In any event, the court says that the
usage is not reasonable and for the following reasons .11
"It [the indorsement] does not make the person's endorsement genuine, if it was in fact forged, it does not increase his
liability to the bank in such a case, it may cause the holder who
is frequently a person who has no actual interest in the paper,
to wit: an agent's attorney, trustee, etc., to run the risk of a
liability by a fraudulent or improper reissue of the note and bill
with his endorsement on it; neither can it be fairly justified on
the ground that the signature is in effect a receipt of the holder,
that he has received money. First, for the reason that the possession of the bill or check is evidence of its payment, Second,
because a party having the obligation of paying money cannot insist on a receipt as a condition precedent to payment;40 Third, if
it were reasonable to call for a receipt in all instances, it would
not follow that there was a right to call for a blank endorsement."
We must postpone until later comment on the use of the blank
indorsement as a receipt device. The important question at this
point is raised by the court's statement that "a party having the
37(1882) 6 Ohio Dec. 1169, 1171, 11 Am. L. Rec. 156.
3
8TIe accepted notion of laissez-faire, in other words, would seenr
to teach that the policy of the courts should be to let good enough
alone. If the 'business world" gets along with such a practice in fact,
and such a-practice is not merely not exceptional but is the ordinarily
expected thing, then the courts are merely impertinent in interfering.
0(1882) 6 Ohio Dec. 1169, 1172, 11 Am. L. Rec. 156.
ociting: Longworth v. Hardy, (1858) 2 Disney (Ohio) 75, 13
Ohio Dec. 47.
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obligation of paying money cannot insist on a receipt as a condition precedent to payment." What basis either in prior decision or in policy is there for such a statement?
In Osborn v. Gheen, the question before the court was
whether the auditor in a partnership accounting might properly
reject, as improper proof of a payment made by one of the partners, a check to that partner's order, stamped paid by the bank,
found among the other partner's vouchers, but never indorsed by
the payee or anyone else. Obviously, then, the question was perhaps more one of evidence than of the substantive liability of
the drawer. 41 It was in that respect similar to the question involved in the Tennessee decision discussed earlier. The court
said 42 (unnecessarily, it is obvious)
"The bank upon whom the note or bill of exchange is drawn
is authorized and required to pay the money to the payee, knowing him to be the identical man indicated, without any indorsement and -without any receipt. Beyond that, a prudent man might
well hesitate to indorse a paper which was given to him to be paid
at the bank for this reason that if he indorsed it in blank and
without qualification, if the bank pleased, it could, as we know
banks sometimes do, put that paper into circulation again, and
if it should get into the hands of a bona fide holder, he might
hold the payee responsible upon his blank indorsement. Therefore a prudent man might properly decline to indorse, in the legal
sense of the term, a paper when it was paid to him."
In substance though not with entire coherence, nothing different was said in the McCurdy Case. We therefore make the
same disposition. 43 We must, then, make investigation into the
foundation in precedent of the notion, apparently general and
quoted unqualifiedly, that "a party having the obligation of paying
41Cf. supra, note 23.
4219
D. C. 189, 194.
43
in South Africa we have authority to the effect that a receipt
is demandable, and, indeed, in the form of a signature in blank, so
long at least as there is no objection to the form of the receipt demanded. Price v. Natal Bank, (1887) 8 Natal L. R. 153 was an action by a payee against the bank on a cashier's check. The payee had
indorsed the check in blank and had it sent by a clerk (apparently,
of his attorney) to the bank for payment. The clerk was asked to
write his name on the back as a condition of payment, and on his
refusal to do so, the bank refused to pay. The court granted costs
against the plaintiff on the ground that it was proper for the bank
to require a receipt. But it should be likewise noted that this result
may have been affected by Roman-Dutch law, which was said to be,
in Van Noorden v. De Jongh and Hofmeyer, (1892) 9 S. C. (Cape of
Good Hope) 296, 298, that a debtor is not bound to pay unless the
creditor is ready and willing to give a receipt.
But see Neale v. Barlinski, (1910) L. R. 1 C. P D. 350.
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money cannot insist on a receipt as a condition precedent to payment." This is in a sense a collateral investigation, but it is a
necessary one.
EFFECT OF DEMAND FOR A RECEIPT AS A CONDITION OF PAYMENT
IN NoN-BANKING SITUATIONS

The threshold yields the discovery that the situations in
winch the statement about which we are concerned has been made
have involved the sufficiency of a tender by debtor to creditor to
stop interest and shift costs. This discovery, however, should
not make further investigation irrelevant. In order that an action by customer against bank be maintainable, it is the long setfled rule in this country that a proper demand by customer upon
bank and an improper refusal by bank to customer be proved."
It seems most probable that the considerations which move a court
to refuse to inpose the penalty of loss of interest and costs upon
a creditor to whom a debtor has not made a tender which is considered proper will.likewise move the court to refuse to a customer
an action against his bank brought on the allegation of a proper
demand for payment and an improper refusal by the bank to
pay For this purpose it would be immaterial whether the customer's
action be for the sum demanded or for injury to his credit.43 If,
moreover, the action is for the sum demanded, clearly there can
at least be no recovery of interest as damages nor, incidentally,
46

ot CoStS.

44See, e.g., I Morse, Banks & Banking, 5th ed., sec. 289e, 322
(there are many other cases than those cited). In England this was
not settled until Joachimson v. Swiss Banking Corp., [1921] 3 K.
B. 110.
4"The very fact that the tender rule is stated as a proposition without
the addition of the penalty indicates this. In the ordinary debt, for whatever reason, a debtor may be put to defend an action though he is entirely
willing to pay.
4GThe customer may sue, in classical terms, either in indebitats
assumpsit for his balance or in special assumpsit for breach of contract; in the first case he can probably add a count for injury to his
credit and must allege a demand and refusal. In the second case lie
recovers the balance as an item of damage. The practice from Marzetti v. Williams, (1830) 1 B. & Ald. 415, and later cases, was to
count on the bank's undertaking. It seems clear that the customer
is not barred from suing twice: once for the amount of the check,
plus interest from dishonor, and again for injury to his credit.
As another example of other sanctions for tenders, there is the
rule, codified in N. I. L. sec. 20 (4), that a valid tender of payment
by a prior party will discharge a person secondarily liable. Indeed,
in such a case the tender need not be kept good until the trial, whereas it would if the question were solely of interest and costs.
It is to be noted that in the case of the action against the bank,
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Of greater importance is our next discovery We find that
the statement in question, though glibly repeated by some otherwise reputable writers,47 has been broadly made in purest obiter,
without discussion and without amplification. The statement.
for the most part, has been made in cases holding, with citation
of cases likewise holding, that where a debtor demand§ of his creditor as a condition of payment a receipt ti full, the tender will
not be sufficient to stop interest and shift costs.45 In this hold4
ing these cases have the unvarying support of much authority, 9
and it will be hardly denied that their holding is thoroughly
justifiable.
On the other hand, there are dicta"0 and statements by some
the possibility of any recovery at all is conditional on a proper demand,
and if a demand for a receipt have not the effect of not invalidating
the tender, no action at all is maintainable. But in the ordinary debtorcreditor situation where no demand is necessary to condition an action, the debtor may in fact never receive a receipt for his money if
it happens to be the fact in the particular jurisdiction that the creditor need not enter a satisfaction piece or sign some other instrument
showing final payment of the obligation as a condition to payment.
Here,7 then, the sanction is solely in the incidence of interest and costs.
4 See 3 Williston, Contracts sec. 1814, Hunt, Tender sec. 253,
Leake, Contracts 7th ed., p. 651, 2 Greenleaf, Evidence (Lewis's ed.)
p. 706; Story, Contracts 5th ed., p. 587, is ambiguous: he says a tender
is bad, if made "on condition that the creditor will give a receipt or
a release
in full."
48 See Cole v. Blake, (1743) 1 Peake N. P 179; Richardson v.
Boston Chem. Co., (1845) 9 Metc. (Mass.) 42, 52; Holton v. Brown,
(1846) 18 Vt. 224, 226; Sanford v. Bulkley, (1862) 30 Conn. 344, 349
(-it is well settled!'); Roosevelt v. Bull's Head Bank, (1866) 45 Barb.
(N.Y.)
579, 593; Lindsay v. Matthews, (1880) 17 Fla. 575, 591.
49
As see 45 Cent. Dig. Tender sec. 58; 19 Dec. Dig. Tender secs.
64 (2), (5)- 21 Second Dec. Dig. Tender secs. 64 (2), (5), 12 Brit. &
Emp.5 Dig. Contracts, p. 330.
OSee Richardson v. Jackson, (1841) 8 M. & W 298, 9 Dowl. 715;
Bank v. Jones, (1856), 16 Tex. 462; Howard Piano Co. v. Glover,
(1910) 7 Ga. App. 548, 67 S. E. 277; Wistar, Siter & Price v. Robinson,
(1831) 2 Bailey (S.C.) 274; Lovett v. Eastern Oil Co., (1911) 68 W
Va. 667 70 S. E. 707, cf. Jacoway v. Hall, (1900) 67 Ark. 340, 55 S. W
12 (payment by administrator-may involve a statute).
Richardson v. Jackson probably overrules the dictum in Cole v.
Blake, (1743) 1 Peake, N. P 179. Lord Kenyon had said, in Cole v.
Blake, "that it had been determined that a party tendering money
could not in general demand a receipt for the money. There had been
one case indeed in the Exchequer, in which Sir Win. Watkins was a
party, where it was determined that the King's receiver was obligated
to give a receipt, but that was an exception to the general rule."
In Richardson v. Jackson, Rolfe, B., according to 9 Dowl. 715, said:
"In the present state of the law I should wish to encourage every
prudent person to have some evidence of his payments." 8 M. & W
298, adds: "for if they do not, in case of death the representatives
may be deprived of all evidence of the payment."

See the nisi prius case of Jones v. Arthur, (1840)
in which Coleridge, J., vacillates.

8 Dowl, 442,
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writers, : ' somewhat fewer but nevertheless more respectable since
they are at least accompamed by argument, to the effect that the
aemand of a receipt will not per se invalidate a tender. And what
is more, there are statutes in a number of jurisdictions, chiefly
inspired by a section in Field's Draft of the New York Civil Code,
and a section in his Code of Civil Procedure, which expressly provide'that a tender shall not be invalidated by the demand of a
receipt.
The Code of Civil Procedure section, adopted and still in
torce verbatim in a few jurisdictions, 2 states that "whoever pays
is entitled to a receipt therefor, from the person to
money
" The Civil Code section, adopted
is made.
whom payment
and still in force verbatim in other jurisdictions 3 (California,
however, having both sections), is somewhat narrower" "A debtor
has a right to require from his creditor a written receipt for any
There appear to be divers statutes in various jurisdictions providing
for receipts for payments of taxes, fees to public officers, etc.
512 Parsons, Contracts, (8th ed.,) *644 says: "The tender must
be unconditional; so, at least, it is sometimes said: but the reasonable,
and, we think the true rule is, that no condition must be annexed to
the tender which the creditor can have-any good reason whatever for
objecting to: as, for instance, that he should give a receipt in full of
all demands. It may not perhaps be quite settled that if the debtor
demands a receipt for the sum which he pays, and if this be refused.
retains the money, he will thereby (though always ready to pay it on
those terms) lose the benefit of his tender. But the authorities seem
to go in this direction." In the footnote he adds: "It is believed that
no case has gone so far as to hold that a tender would be bad because
a receipt for the sum tendered was requested."
2 Wharton, Comment. on the Law of Contracts 328, says "it has
been held" that a demand for a receipt in full vitiates a tender. Chitty,
Contracts, 17th ed.,) 890, is to the same effect.
-2Calif.Code Civ. Proced. 1923 sec. 2075, Mont. Rev. Codes 1921.

sec. 10681, Oreg. L. 1920, sec. 876; Utah Comp. L. 1917, sec. 7216;

Alaska Comp. L. 1913, ch. 67, sec. 1512. The section in Field's final
draft, submitted to the New York legislature in 1850, was sec. 1860
(Final Report of the Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings [1850]
782). No such section, however, is to be found in Field's 1889 draft
of the Code of Evidence (Final Report of the Commissioners to report
a Code of Evidence [1889]).
53
Calif. Civ. Code 1923, sec. 1499- N. Dak. Comp. L. 1913. Civ.
Code sec. 5814; S. Dak. Rev. Code 1919 sec 772; Idaho, Comp. Stat.
1919, tit. 45, ch. 224 sec. 5671. This was see. 720 of Field's Civil Code of
1865 (The Civil Code of the State of New York, reported complete by
the commissioners of the Code [1865] 213). This report was the ninth.
Its proThe annotation is as follows: "This provision is new
priety should seem scarcely to admit of doubt." Sec. 715 is: "An
offer of performance must be free from any conditions which the
creditor is not bound on his part to perform." The annotation states:
"It is proposed, however, to sanction a demand for a receipt." But no
reference is made to the Code of Civil Procedure of 1850.
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property delivered in performance of his obligation." In three
other states, the provisions deal in terms with tender.54
Insofar as the argument is made that a tender must, as it
were in the nature of things, be unconditional to be effective, the
answer is two-fold. First, the question is begged, second, it is at
least true that there are conditions in all tenders, as, for instance,
that the creditor shall not evade the debtor when the debtor makes
a tender, that the creditor shall take the payment offered and not
require the debtor to place it in the creditor's pockets or in his
hands, and so on. As it has sometimes been said,5 a tender
"may be surrounded by reasonable conditions."
Insofar as the argument invokes pragmatism, it must be to
the effect that having to give a receipt. would be burdensome on
54

So far as has been found, Iowa Code 1924 sec. 9450 represents the
oldest statutory provision in this country. The section first appeared
in the Iowa Code of 1851, one of whose draftsmen was Charles Mason
(the others being William G. Woodward and Stephen Hempstead).
Charles Mason had practiced law in New York. Time enough had
passed from the appearance of Field's Code of Civil Procedure for tile
Iowa commissioners to have seen it. Possibly the commissioners had
been in correspondence with Field. On the other hand, of course, so far
as the evidence available to the present writer shows, it is possible that
the idea was original with the Iowa commissioners. The Iowa commissioners might have left us some commentary if it were not for the
Iowa Senate which defeated a resolution that Mason and Woodward
should explain the new code. See Powell, History of the Codes of
Iowa Law, (1912) 10 Iowa Journ. of Hist. & Polit. 20. In any event.
the Iowa section is clearly phrased differently from the Field section.
The Iowa section reads: "The person making a tender may demand a
receipt in writing for the money or article tendered, as a condition
"
The Field section reads:
precedent to the delivery thereof
"Whoever pays money, or delivers an instrument or property, is entitled to a receipt therefor from the person to whom the payment or
delivery is made and may demand a proper signature to such receipt
as a condition to the payment or delivery"
Connecticut and Rhode Island have statutes showing a common
origin but which appear to be wholly unconnected with either the
Iowa or Field provisions. Apparently Connecticut was the first. Now
found in Conn. Gen. Stat. 1918, sec. 5772, it was originally adopted in
1879 (Laws 1879 ch. 26.) A marginal note merely contains a reference
to 30 Conn. 344, as to which see supra, note 48. Since the case in
30 Connecticut was decided in 1862, we may perhaps attribute the
new section to long-slumbering anger at a dictum or an unfortunate
experience of somebody whose adversary cited 30 Connecticut about
1879. The statute reads: "The requirement or demand for a receipt
for such amount of lawful money as may be offered or tendered on
account, or in payment or part payment of any indebtedness, shall
not prevent such offer or tender from being regarded or held to be a
legal tender." R. I. Gen. L. 1923, Act. xxxiii, ch. 338 (4921) sec. 8 merely
substitutes "of a receipt" for "for a receipt" and omits from the
-words "tendered" until "shall." It appears to have been enacted in 1904
(Pub. Laws, 1904, 1151).
As to the successive sections in the English stamp acts see intra,
note 102.
-,See notes 51 and 52, supra.
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an illiterate creditor, or a blind one, or a disabled one. " Such an
argument might have been listened to without merriment if advanced some centuries ago in regard to non-business transactions,
but even then not if advanced in regard to business trasactions,
and certainly not today. At most, one might admit, if the debtor
wishes a receipt, he should provide the writing material and prepare the receipt itself, leaving for the creditor merely the labor
of signing his name.57 It seems clear that a rule that a creditor
may with impumty .refuse to give a receipt of payment runs
counter to the expectations of men because it runs counter to
their practice. Where such a rule is proposed, its proponents
bear the burden of justifying its adoption.
REASONS OF CONVENIENCE OR FAIRNESS JUSTIFYING DEMAND
OF A RECEIPT

But what are the reasons of convenience or fairness which

should justify a payer-and more particularly a drawee bank-in
demanding a receipt as a condition of payment? In the first place,
of course, in case of dispute between drawer and bank as to the
question of whether payment has been made to the proper person,
the receipt of that person properly authenticated would establish
a prima facie case and avoid the treachery of lapsing memories
and failure of witnesses. The mere possession by the bank of the
check would not be of equal strength. s Moreover, should it turn
out that the bank may recover from the holder the amount paid
5GThis argument has been in effect made by Hunt, Tender sec.
253. That author says: "If a debtor for any reason wants to have
evidence of a payment other than his own testimony, he should take
witnesses with him at the tine he goes to pay the money." Yet the
same author says (see. 246) that the condition of identification is
and "such requirement is a prudent precautionary measure."
"lawful"
57
Cf. Laing v. Meader, (1824) 1 C. & P. 257 (decided under
English Stamp Act referred to infra, note 110). The same qualification
is suggested by the terms of Field's Code of Civil Procedure provision
The payer of money, it says, "may demand a
(see supra, note 53).
proper signature to such receipt as a condition of the payment or
delivery."
58
That is to say, a signed receipt is, as Wigmore says, 5 Wigmore,
Evid. 2d ed., sec. 2518, "the strongest evideitce, and some courts seem
to give it the force of a real presumption." The possession of the
check would be effective both as against the drawer and as against
the holder, perhaps, if the holder's name appeared on the instrument,
but it would seem that, especially when invoked against the holder,
not much evidence would be necessary to rebut an inference of payment
from mere possession, though such an inference might be allowable.
Wigmore, ibid. See 2 Daniel, Negotiable Instruments 5th ed.. sec.
1647 By sec. 74 of the N. I. L.. it should be noted, "the instrument
when it is paid must be delivered up to the party paving it"see note 67 infra.
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(as it may if the check was altered or a prior indorsement forged)
the bank may establish prima facie the fact of payment by proot
of the execution of the receipt5 9 In view of the importance of
the role of the commercial bank in our society and the usual difficulty of securing truthful witnesses able to recall the facts of
payment, the execution of a receipt seems a most reasonable desideratum. 6 Lastly, it is important at least for bookkeeping purposes that the drawer should have immediately available evidence
that payment was received by the holder." If it is a reasonable
condition of payment that the holder shall surrender the check,0 1
it is no less reasonable that he shall execute a receipt. Indeed,
it seems almost beyond argument that a bank should be privileged
to refuse payment on a check unless the holder signs a receipt of
payment-as well on the ground of benefit to the bank as on the
ground of benefit to the customer-drawer who, the bank may
reasonably assume, will expect that the bank will produce the
receipt of the person to whom payment was made.
THE FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION AND RECEIPT WHICH SHOULD BE

SANCTIONED

Having, then, arrived at the point where it seems justifiable

that a bank's demand for some form of identification and of receipt of payment should be sanctioned and is sanctioned, it is sub5
The case is much stronger against the holder when the receipt
is offered as an admission against interest. See authorities in note
51, supra.
00
ne should add that the receipt may become very important
under the Dead Men's statutes in case the person who, it is alleged,
received payment, is now dead and it is sought to give the details of
a transaction with him. 1 Wigmore, Evid. 2d ed., sees. 488, 578.
At least, the question might be arguable. In New York, however, the
following sentence in the statute (Civ. Prac. Act 347) dispels doubt.
"'A person shall not be deemed interested for the purposes of this

section by reason of being a stockholder or officer of any banking
corporation which is a party to the action or proceeding, or interested
in the event thereof."
G'As one banker put it, the bank is under a duty to the drawer
not only to return vouchers but to secure the holder's receipt. In the
actual working of business, this aspect of the problem is most inter
esting. It suggests that the bank may not be privileged to reduce the
scope of its obligation to the drawer by the amount of the check
because the customer is not given a convenient means-indeed, the
convenient means-of proving payment as between him and the holder.
62Sec. 74 seems to make it so. See note 58, supra. The language
:s that "when it is paid" "it must be delivered up." This might suggest
a condition subsequent. But when one considers the inconvenience
of a rule placing on thc drawer the necessity of pursuing a recalcitrant
or evilly disposed recipient of payment in order to secure the check,
it seems clear that the section must be interpreted as laying down a
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mtted, by the force of law, 63 the problem becomes, what form or
forms of identification and receipt shall we sanction and what
not? -To solve this problem requires, it would seem, a consideration first of the forms which banks in fact demand, receive, and
consider satisfactory, and second whether the use of such forms
may be unnecessarily burdensome or unfair to customers who

draw checks or to holders who receive them.

That is to say,

assuming the function of law to be the regulation of banking as a
smoothly operating institution in a society tolerably satisfied, what
conduct, if sanctioned by the force of law, would be most conducive to the efficient performance of that function.
To discover the relevant practices of banks (and, by inference, the customary practice of the people dealing with the banks)
all over the United States, a questionnaire was sent to a selected
list of representative bankers in every federal reserve district.64
The bankers chosen in each district, so far as possible, represented
small, medium-sized and large banks, covering both urban and
rural populations. In addition, personal conversations were had
with the New York commercial bankers, personally acquainted
with the practice in large, medium-sized and small banks in different parts of New York City. The results of this investigahon, generally, may be set down here. It should, however, be
noted that it is not impossible that some of the answers received
represent to some extent what the banker answering would like
rule of conditions concurrent at most. That is, the surrender of the
check is required, as regards the drawer, to prevent the possibility
of a holder's in due course charging the drawer after payment by the
drawee.
GThis is the force of the present discussion. It is usually possible
to leave desirable standards of conduct to enforcement by non-legal
sanctions, and often it is most useful to do so. An example is to be
found in the case of the demand note given the bank when it is
assumed, in practice, that the extension of credit given in return will
be indefinite in term; the reason for making the note demand instead
of time is very often precisely this. If a bank exercises its legal
power of making demand or bringing suit or dishonoring the customer's
orders (which seems clear, though it is not quite so clear that notice
is not a condition to the bank's power'-authority is rare: the consequence may be the more drastic one of loss of business. The legal
sanction, in other words, will operate, in practice, as a safety valve in
unusual contingencies.
64140 questionnaires were sent out, 79 answers were received. The
total percentage of answers is a fair indication of the percentage in
each district except that in the sixth district (federal reserve city
being Atlanta), the eighth district (St. Louis), the tenth (Kansas
City), and the eleventh (Dallas), the percentage of answers was less
than 50 per cent. The questionnaires were sent out as part of the
study of commercial bank credit, being made under the general
direction of Professor Underhill Moore of the Columbia Law School.
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to be the manner of doing business rather than the manner in
which business is actually done. 5 But such a possibility in a
few cases can not affect the accuracy of the results here described.
COMPOSITE

OF BANKING PRACTICE

FORMS OF IDENTIFICATION

Let us take first the matter of identification. Most banks do
not require any identification where the item presented is payable to bearer and is small. What a small item is varies, in some
banks it is up to $25, in others $50, in others-apparently--$100.
In case the amounts are larger, it is not infrequent to reach the
drawer or seek to ascertain by other means that the holder is entitled to payment. There is, of course, no legal necessity for banks
to seek any identification in case of bearer checks, but the bank's
solicitude may be induced by motives other than legal necessity 00
Where a check payable to order is presented indorsed in blank,
the holder will not only be asked to identify himself, but will be
asked to bring proof of the genuineness of the indorsement of
the payee. Indeed-and this may be some measure of the frequency of transfers from payees to other persons not bankersshrewd tellers will frequently refuse to pay such checks except
on the most convincing proof of valid title."7
As a general rule it may be stated that where a check is payable to order it is the practice of banks in this country to require
aii identification. It is true, however, that in some banks if the
check be for a small sum no identification will be demanded of
the holder unless the teller's suspicions are in some manner
aroused. There are a number of reasons for this, and these reasons hold good for any laxness in identification. The bank may
be, or thinks it is, insured against improper payments. 68 The
amount may be so small that one would suppose that no thief
would risk discovery for so small a prize the volume of business
65Occasionally such an admission was made. This is one of the

psychological factors that must always be taken into account.
66See note 63 supra.
7
6 A paying teller in one of the world's largest banks stated to
the writer that he would not pay a check indorsed in blank by a person
not the payee. In that bank, situated in the New York financial district,
counter presentations are comparatively rare and persons receiving
checks do not pay bills by-means of them or otherwise negotiate them.
Yet if the teller's statement is any indication of his actual conduct,
here is further proof that actions against banks for dishonor under
such0 5circumstances are practically inconsequential.
Such laxness may be immoral and possibly a basis for defense
by the insurer against the bank; but it is nevertheless, as one banker
writes, a real factor.
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is too large to pay serious attention to such cases-the loss is bound
to be, comparatively speaking, only slight.a The methods ot
identification, however, vary depending on the circumstances surrounding the payment, the size of the item and other considerations. In a few banks-obviously not large banks-there may
even be a rule that in certain instances the decision of whether
or not the identification is sufficient must be made by a bank
officer. We may note as we pass that it is less frequent for the
banks to take the initiative in making the investigation, rather
the rule is that it is for the holder to satisfy the passive bank.
Often the drawer is communicated with by telephone and asked
to describe the payee-holder; or a messenger may even be sent
to the drawer personally, where the telephone seems of dubious
reliability 70
When the item is comparatively small--the definition of
smallness being frequently the same as that described in the previous paragraph-nearly all banks will usually be satisfied with
identification made by the holder himself production of letters,
initials or clothing or jewelry, passport, automobile license, and
the like, till the teller is satisfied. But in-larger items, third persons must be asked to identify or the bank will not pay" it may
certify, perhaps, but it will not pay 7 ' It is in this case, as will
hereafter appear, that existent practice becomes important for our
purposes.
In some small banks, usually situated-no doubt-in districts
ot relatively stable population, 2 identification as a rule is oral.
The holder secures a person known to the bank to be respectable
and honest, which very often means financially responsible, if
9
16
In particular localities or instances, however, it may be far from
slight. A general laxness may tend to encourage more and more
thievery
by the use of checks for small amounts.
7
OThis is a device which is resorted to, for instance, in the 42nd
Street district of New York City. The frequency, in that vicinity, of
blackmail, swindling and similar practices giving rise to defenses on
the part of the drawer is so great that bank tellers will be more often
suspicious of irregularity than they might in other vicinities. Of
course, the irregularity may not be in the identity of the holder but still
it may be, and a telephone conversation with a person purporting to be
the drawer is not safe. Whether or under what circumstances a bank
will not be privileged to debit the drawer if he has defenses against the
holder but has not stopped payment, is a subject which can not be
discussed here.
71This suggests the different meanings which "payment" may have
in different
contexts.
72
Such, for instance, appear to be the banks in the South and in the
far North West. It merely means that experience has not shown extra
precautions to be necessary.
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not substantial.7 3 This person, more often a customer of the
bank, appears at the teller's window and states that he knows the
person in possession of the check, and that his name is so-and-so
(which is the name of the payee on the check). He may add
how he came to know him and that he is a reliable person, and
so forth. The teller then may merely make a notation on the
check in pencil that so-and-so identified the payee, and perhaps
take the holder's address (as is, in fact, done in any case). There
is thus no assumption in terms by the identifier of the risk of the
payee intended not being the person receiving payment but being
simply a person of the same name.
In the larger number of cases, however (taking the country
as a whole), the identifier will be asked to write his name on the
check in some manner. He may write it away from the banking
house under the indorsement of the holder, and the bank teller
at his window may thereafter observe the holder repeat the indorsement and- may then compare both indorsements. The identifier may or may not, in this case, qualify his own signature with
words to the effect of "for identification." In a number of banks,
it seems to be the practice for the signature by the identifier to
be accompanied by the words "for identification only" On the
other hand, many banks demand a blank indorsement. The evidence indicates that the identifier in many banks is told that by
indorsing in blank he guarantees the identity of the holder with
the payee. Other answers tend to show that the identifier is told
he is assuming the full liability of an indorser, much as though
he were transferring to this bank a check drawn on a third bank.
In other banks, nothing-apparently-is told the identifier by way
of explanation, while in others still the legend customarily given,
received and requested seems to be "indorsement guaranteed" or
something of like import. But it is assumed in almost every case
where there is a signature unqualified that the signature operates
to impose on the identifier liabilities much greater than those
imposed by a mere oral identification. Whether or not these
signatures may be said in fact to impose such liabilities in general.
73With this compare the statement from Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Reynolds, (1919) 72 Ind. App. 611, 126 N. E. 234. Solvency, in other words, is
a convenient index to reliability. A bank teller or officer can not make
a prolonged and intimate investigation into the character of the identifier.
Experience shows that in most cases a man with a going business
and a business reputation will not lightly give assurance or make
representations leading to pecuniary reliance by others.
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whatever they may be conceived to be in particular, is a knot
which must be untied but whch will be untied later.
In payroll checks, we have a special situation. Industrial or
trade workers are frequently not able to deposit checks with banks.
Such checks are therefore either cashed with tradesmen or paid
over the counter. Here we have a variety of practice. Not infrequently, special agreements to govern payment of such checks

are made with the employer-drawer. Under some agreements
the bank will have on file a specimen copy of the signature of
each employee paid by check, and when the check is presented
the holder is asked to sign Is name for comparison with the signature on file. Under other agreements,, the drawer or a duly
delegated officer of the drawer countersigns. a specimen signature
of the payee on the check and when presented the holder repeats
his signature. In other cases, apparently, the payees have identification cards which they exhibit. Finally, it is quite common
that payroll checks, if presented by the payee within such a period
after delivery that the chances of loss or theft are few and slight.
are honored without any identification. 4 It should be noted, however, that in the last case and indeed in any of the cases that have
been discussed, special agreements may be made with the drawer
that the bank shall be privileged to debit the drawer if it pays
in the exercise of due care. The risk, if any, of having to pay
the payee a second time is one which the employer-drawer assumes.7 - In this respect, the situation of the bank is similar to
that in which it is placed where the drawer writes on the check
"waive identification"-a not uncommon occurrence.10
74Many payroll checks may have such notations on them. Another
manifestation of the same experimental notion is to be found in the
hortatory notation on payroll checks: "Not good if not presented
within - days."
75Although assumed by the drawer-customer as between it and the
bank, nevertheless the risk may, perhaps, be in actuality shifted by
the drawer-employer to the employee-payee. This solution may be
socially inequitable, but it is not, it seems clear, legally unsanctioned.
7rThe most common uses of the "waive identification" device are
in telegraphic orders and bank drafts. If John Stiles of St. Louis is
going to New York and wants to be able to secure funds in New York.
he will get his local bank to draw in his favor a check on a New York
correspondent. The check is delivered to John Stiles. The drawer
bank will notify the drawee that the check, described, has been drawn;
and the drawer will at the same time describe the payee. Often a
specimen of'the payee's signature is included in the advice. When the
signature is not included, the payee will have to go through the usual
procedure of identification. This procedure may be embarrassing.
In such an event, the drawer will add, "waive identification." The same
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Thus the devices by which the commercial bank seeks to
minimize the risk it assumes of paying without the privilege of reimbursement from the drawer are many The devices by which
the bank secures from the holder a memorial of receipt of payment are, per contra, few Inquiries yield the following results
COMPOSITE OF BANKING PRACTICE.

FORMS OF RECEIPT

First. The answers are unanimous to the effect that the
usual practice is to demand and to receive from the person presenting for payment a signature in blank on the back of the check.
Second. Many bank officers would pay without any such
receipt-indorsement if the check be in terms on its face payable
to bearer. Most of these would still demand an indorsement of
receipt of payment if the check had been indorsed in blank by the
7
payee.
Third. With a very few exceptions, receipts "received payment" subscribed with the signature of the holder would be accepted. Those banks that refuse to accept such a legend, either
at all or without a further blank indorsement, apparently suppose that the blank indorsement imposes on the recipient of payment the substantive liabilities consequent to a transfer made by
blank indorsement. It further appears that "received payment"
is true if John Stiles, in New York, asks his St. Louis bank to send
a telegraphic order to its New York correspondent. Specimen signatures are not, in the present state of science, conveniently transmissible
in such a case. Clearly "waive identification" will not be added where
the risk of loss seems more than usually probable: the payee will have
to take
77 the trouble of identification.
There is of course adequate legal reason for distinguishing
between a check payable to bearer on its face and one indorsed in

blank.

Where the check is payable to bearer on its face, the bank

assumes the risk of forgery of the drawer's signature, insufficiency
of the drawer's account, and alteration. These contingencies can be
in most cases well taken care of by the paying bank. But in the case
of forged indorsements, the bank is in a helpless position, under the
general rule in this country. It has been otherwise in England since
1853. Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, sec. 60, reenacting in substance the
provision in the Stamp Act, 1853 (16 & 17 Vict. c. 59). This section
substantially appears likewise in statutes elsewhere in the British
Empire. See, e. g., Australian Bills of Exchange Act. 1909 sec. 65 (1),
South African Bills of Exchange Act, sec. 58; Negotiable Instruments
Act of British India, 1881, sec. 85. Similar provisions are found on
the continent. See Lorenzen, Conflict of Laws Relating to Bills and
Notes 47 Canada rejected the section. See Maclaren, Bills, Notes and
Cheques, 5th ed., 146. But the legal sanctions to the use of crossed
cheques have a most important relevance. See Bouteron, Le Cheque
82-96. As to the question of whether the bank even in England is
protected by payment to one who does not purport to be other than
the payee, see infra, note 95.
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indorsements are most common when the holder is a bank, that
it is not infrequently printed on checks given as expense vouchers
or it is written by the drawer as a memorial of the transaction
between him and the holder (e.g., "received in full payment when
endorsed"). A rubber stamp indorsement "Pay to" the drawee
bank often occurs when the holder is a customer depositing for
credit.
Fourth. It appears to be almost universally true that the bank
will refuse to accept a receipt written on a separate sheet of
paper 78
Finally, there is common among bankers (though it is far
from universal) the notion that the receipt-indorsement operates
as does a transfer-indorsement, at least in the respect that the
holder is obligated to reimburse if the drawer's account prove
insufficient. Some bankers go even further. Such notions may
be an indication of what is actually and successfully done to nonlitigious persons. On the other hand, there is evidence that bank
officers will sometimes explain to holders that the indorsement
operates only as a receipt. 79

THE CONSIDERATIONs DETERMINING THE FORMS TO BE
SANCTIONED

These things, then, being what banks actually do, why not
sanction the doing? To be enabled to answer this question with
intelligence, however, we must yet explore the consequences that
may possibly beset the person who identifies and the person who
gives his receipt. More specifically, we have to ascertain what
obligations the identifier assumes by identifying in the various
ways mentioned and the recipient of payment by executing in the
various ways mentioned a memorial of receipt. If these obligations seem Unnecessarily forced by drawee banks, the courts may
-because
they have the power and the prerogative-give the
customer his action against the bank if it refuses payment on any
conditions other than these.
MEMORIALS OF IDENTIFICATION AND RECEIPT OTHER THAN SIGNATURE IN BLANK

So far as both identification and receipt are concerned, we
need not devote much consideration to any device other than the
7sThis is not to be understood as meaning that banks in practice
refuse; rather, that bankers have not been confronted with such
meticulous
holders: bankers merely say they would refuse such receipts.
79Tlus evidence is not considerable. Most bank officers, rather,
do not appear to have given the matter much thought.
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signature in blank. As to self-identification by the holder, no
discussion is necessary"
As to oral identification by a third
person, waiving the applicability of the statute of frauds, 81 it
would seem that in the ordinary case the identifier would assume
solely the obligation of responding in damages if the identification
should turn out to have been false and either negligently made
or made with knowledge of the falsity If it merely appeared
that the person claiming to be the holder and the person designated by the terms of the check were different persons with the
same name, the identifier would not be subject to an action by
the bank. It might, in addition, be that under special circumstances a court might spell out a representation by the identifier
that in his opinion the person purporting to be the holder was
honest and probably rightfully entitled to payment.82 A clear
case of assumption of liability as a guarantor of identity would,
it is submitted, be held necessary in order to impose a liability
of such guarantee on the identifier The same would be true of
an indorsement "for identification only" or the like.83
80
It may be that a bank will ask a holder to assume obligations
other than those which would be imposed on him without express
assumption.
This contingency need not be gone into here.
81
The question whether the statute of frauds may not be applicable
is by no means an unimportant point. First, logically, there is the
problem of interpretation of language and second, the problem of
whether the statute applies. Whether, except in the case of an undertaking so express that it would be almost impossible not to say that
the statute did not apply, the conduct of the identifier would be
spelled out as a promise to answer for the default of the recipient of
payment might depend on all sorts of formalistics. A distinction
would perhaps be drawn between a promise to make whole if the
recipient, being obligated to repay, should not repay and a promise
to pay if there should be a loss, regardless of the existence of any
obligation on the part of the recipient. If there were a serious misrepresentation, liability could be predicated on deceit. Lahay v. City
Nat'l Bank of Denver, (1890) 15 Colo. 339, 25 Pac. 704. If there were
negligence, there could be the old problem of Derry'v. Peek or its
more recent development in the fdrm of plain liability for negligence.
Even where a-blank signature is used to memorialize, the problem arises
again if it is assumed that the N. I. L. is not per se applicable. It is
worth noting that some answers received indicate a practice of making
payment to the identifier- that may be primarily "to have money pass,"
but in the respect of the statute of frauds it may have a magic effect.
In any event, this discussion may assume, as is most probable, that
the statute will be no defense.
82Some answers from bankers indicate that such a representation
would not be satisfactory; probably most banks would refuse it-certainly if an indorsement were asked for. See Commercial Press v.
Crescent City Nat'l Bank, (1874) 26 La. Ann. 744.
83"Signature 0. K." presents a question of interpretation. Probably it would be held to include a representation that the person
purporting to sign that name was known to the identifier by that
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Similarly, in receiving payment by giving a receipt on a
separate sheet of paper, or writing above lus name a legend like
"received payment," the signatory, it would be held, assumes no
substantive obligations to which he would not otherwise be subjected. In short, the two-fold mystery is whether and when the obligations of warranty which attach to the transferor by blank indorsement attach, first, where identification, next, where receipt
of payment, is integrated by a signature in blank pictorially identical with an unqualified transfer mdorsement.
SIGNATURE IN BLANK FOR IDENTIFICATION

DECIDED CASES

Of decided cases on the effect of blank indorsements for
identification there are but few, and they are inconclusive. On
the one hand, we have a Louisiana decision of 187484 which admitted parol evidence of a conversation between the identifier
and the teller of the drawee bank tending to show that the only
liability assumed by the identifier was that of the identity of the
person to whom payment was made by the bank there being
no dispute on this score, judgment was given for the plaintiff.
On the other hand, we have a lower court decision in New York,85
decided after the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The
payee had raised the check. Without discussion or adequate detail to indicate whether the admission of parol evidence was in
issue, the court held the identifier liable to the bank for the amount
by which the check had been raised. The reason for liability
was tersely stated by denominating the identifier an accommodation indorser within the meaning of the Negotiable Instruments
name; i. e., it would not mean merely that this was the signature of
the person who bore the check. Any other result would be, in practice.
absurd. But whether a warranty of authenticity of indorsement would
also be added seems more difficult. The same, indeed, might by some
be said to be true of "identification guaranteed" or similar legends which
do not in terms limit representation to belief.
Cf. Faulkner v. Bank of Italy, (1924) 69 Cal. App. 370, 231 Pac. 380,
in which the plaintiff, a customer of the defendant bank, was charged
with the amount of a forged check drawn on another bank deposited
by X and against which X had drawn. X, a fellow employee of the
plaintiff, asked the plaintiff to introduce him to his, the plaintiff's bank.
The plaintiff did so and X then opened an account in the names of
himself and the plaintiff, jointly, depositing the check in suit and
drawing before collection. It was held that the plaintiff's pri-ate
account could not be charged, the court saying that the plaintiff's
statement to the bank was true. The court noted that the check
had 84
not been mdorsed by the plaintiff.
Commercial Press v. Crescent City Nat'l Bank, (1874) 26 La.
Ann. 744.
85Smith v. State Bank, (1907) 54 Misc. Rep. 550, 104 N. Y. S. 750.
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Law In between these decisions, we have the decision of a lower
Pennsylvania court.86 The bank had paid on a forged drawer's
signature. The court argued that the identifier was liable to the
bank within the meaning of the Pennsylvania statute87 which
abolished the rule of Price v. Neal in Pennsylvania. The parts of
the statute relied on were
"That whenever any value or amount shall be received
in payment of any
check
by the holder thereof, from the
endorsee
or payer
of the same
such endorsee as well
as such payer
shall be legally entitled to recover back from
"
previously holding or negotiating the same.
the person
It was immaterial, the court said, that the payment had been made
to the party identified and not to the identifier But the court
further said that under the negotiable instruments law the bank
was a holder in due course and the plaintiff liable as an indorser
within section 66. So far as concerned the evidence offered by
the identifier in respect to the conversation surrounding the writing of his name on the check, the court said.88
"Nowhere in the evidence is there any definite agreement that
the plaintiff's endorsement should not have its full legal effect.
The proof of the agreement must be clear, precise and indubitable."
Therefore judgment agams the bank on a directed verdict was
reversed and judgment ordered entered for the bank.
If the identification were incident to a purchase of the check,
that is, a transfer for value to a bank other than the drawee bank,
it would seem clear that under sections 63 and 64 of the Negotiable Instruments Law (which, respectively, provide that anyone
who without qualification places his name on an instrument other
than as maker, drawer or acceptor, shall be liable as an indorser
and that any person placing his pame on an instrument before delivery shall, roughly, be liable to subsequent parties as an indorser) parol evidence would be inadmissible to show that a person who had placed his name on a check did so under an agreement that his signature was to serve merely as a memorial of
identification. The cases squarely on the point before the Nego86 Judge v. West Phila. T. & Tr. Co., (1917) 68 Pa. Super. 310. For
disagreement apparently, with the reasoning in this decision, see
Brannan, Negotiable Instruments- Law Annotated 4th ed., 560. 2
Paton, Digest.sec. 2829a, takes the view that parol evidence ought not
to be admissible; it must not be forgotten that the editor is something
of a 8 bank's advocate.
7Pa. Act April 5, 1849, sec. 10, P L. 426, Pa. Stat. 1920, sec. 16011.
88 Judge v. West Phila. T. & Tr. Co., (1917) 68 Pa. Super. 310, 317
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tiable Instruments Law so held ;89 and in any event the liability of
the identifier would be that particular form which was imposed
0
May the
on irregular indorsers in the particular jurisdicton.
prognostication be with assurance made that the liability of the
identifier for payment, as distinguished from purchase, will be
the same? If not, which if any of. the divergent results reached
in the three cases discussed may be said to represent what most
courts, after adequate presentation of argument, would decide?
SIGNATURE IN BLANK FOR RECEIPT

DECMED CASES

Before passing to that interesting inquiry, we should dispose of the cases on receipt-indorsement. The disposition is short.
Stated m general terms, there is practically no dissent and by
this time it is indeed trite learning that neither within the provisions of the negotiable instruments law nor without them is
89Rossi v. Natl Bank of Commerce, (1897) 71 Mo. App. 150;
Cochran v. Atchison, (1882) 27 Kan. 728; Geneser v. Wissner, (1886)
69 Iowa 119, 28 N. W 471, Prescott Bank v. Caverly, (1856) 7 Gray
(-Mass.) 217; Thompson v. M'Kee, (1888) 5 Dak. 172; Stack v. Beach,
(1880) 74 Ind. 571, Alabama Nat'l Bank v. Rivers, (1896) 116 Ala.
1, 22 So. 580. See Susquehanna Valley Bk. v. Pickering, (1879) 19
Hun 230, aff'd. (1881) 58 N. Y. 207.
The first two cases cited, and the last, involve bank checks and,
perhaps, it may be said that in them the parol evidence would not be
convincing if admitted. In the Rossi Case. the evidence was simply
that the bank teller told the identifier "he would have to indorse it
[the check], and put -his name there, indicating under hers (the impos" and the identifier said: "Don't pay her until you send it east
tor's]
and see if it is good." It happened that the person intended as payee
and the impostor had the same names. The.appellate court affirmed a
judgment of -the trial court for the bank. In the Cochran Case, the
draft was payable to Owens. The identifier said to the bank teller- "I
know this man: his name is Will Owen" and added that he had known
him for two years and always as William Owen. The cashier told the
purported payee to indorse "and then pushed the draft to Cochran
[the identifier] and he wrote his name just below that of Owen."
The Susquehanna Case, where the payee's name had been altered by
the impostor, held that to charge the identifier he must be charged
as indorser. In Geneser v. Wissner the action was on a promissory
note and the court refused to allow parol evidence to show there was
"no contract" though it would allow evidence, it said, to show a
different contract. The remaining cases are clear, apparently, for the
point though they involve bills of exchange. Cf. Amer. Bk. v. Macondray & Co., (1905) 4 Phillip. 695 where "the signature is 0. K." was
altered by the addition of "payment guaranteed," and the court held
that 90the identifier was thereby discharged.
The variety of rules may be found set out in Norton, Handbook of the Law of Bills and Notes, 4th ed., 183-193; 1 Ames, Cases
on Bills and Notes 269 note. The extreme case from which one starts
is that the signature is devoid of any meaning and hence is subject
to any kind of parol evidence to explain what it was intended to
memorialize.
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there a rule which imposes on the holder of a check who surrenders the instrument to the drawee for payment the obligation of a transferor. Of course, this is not a proposition of logical necessity but a description of doctrine and results actually
reached. Nor is this rule, it seems clear, affected by the fact
that the person presenting for payment-holder or no holderwrites his name on the back as a condition of payment. 91 The
long line of cases, for instance, that once the drawee has paid it
cannot recover back from the recipient-holder when it turns out
the drawer's account is insufficient92 illustrates that, regardless of
whether the holder or recipient had written his name on the check
before payment, there exists perforce no warranty of solvency
The same holds true of the other warranties.93 No doubt there
91On both these points see note 31, supra. In Keene v. Beard,
(1860) 8 C. B. (N.S.) 372, 382, Erle, C. J., said: "It is true that a
man's name may be and very often is written on the back of a checque
or bill without any idea of rendering himself liable as an indorser.
Indeed, one of the best receipts is the placing on the back of the
instrument of the name of the person who has received payment of it.
Such an entry of the name on the instrument is not an indorsement.
So a man frequently writes his name on the back of a bank note. In
all these cases, the act of writing may or may not be an indorsement
according to circumstances." See also Grant, Banking, 7th ed., 19"
Chalmers, Bills of Exchange 9th ed., 219, note S to sec. 56 of the
B. E. A. ("If a person signs a bill otherwise than as drawer or
acceptor, he thereby incurs the liability of an indorser to a holder in
due course.") "It is clear that an indorsement by way of receipt does
not come within this rule." The rule is often stated to be one of
whether the signature was written "ammo indorsandi" as see 1
Morse, Banks and Banking, 5th ed., 701, Paget, Banking 3rd ed., 120.
See also Brannan's Review of Daniel on Negot. Instr., 17 Harv. L.
Rev. 580.
92Oddie v. Nat'l City Bank, (1871) 45 N. Y 735; Ark. Trust &
Banking Co. v. Bishop, (1915) 119 Ark. 373, 178 S. W 422; Amer.
Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Gregg, (1891) 138 Ill. 596, 28 N. E. 839; City
Nat'l Bank of Selma v. Burns. (1880) 68 Ala. 267" Gruber v. Bank of
Amer., (1926) 215 N. Y. S. 22, 127 Misc. Rep. 132; Cohen v. First

Nat'l Bank of Nogales, (1921) 22 Ariz. 134, 198 Pac. 122; First Nat'l

Bank v. Mammoth B. G. Coal Co., (1922) 194 Ky 580 240 S. W 78.
Woodward v. Savings & T. Co., (1919) 178 N. C. 184, 100 S. E. 304;
Schutte v. Citizens' Bank of Haynesville, (1926) 3 La. App. 547
9
31Brannan, Neg. Instruments, 4th ed., 556 et seq. Cf. Levy v.
Bank of U. S., (1802) 4 Dall. (Pa.) 234; McLendon v. Bank of Advance,
(1915) 188 Mo. App. 417 In these two cases the drawer's signature
was forged, but it is not stated whether the customer wrote his name
on the back:-if invariable practice is an indication of what may have
been the fact in these cases, especially in the last, it seems safe to
say the customer wrote his name on the back.
In Ark. Nat'l Bank v. Gunther, (1917) 127 Ark. 149, 191 S. W
901 the court put the risk of instfficiency of the drawer's account on
the recipient who was not even the holder. The customer had written
his name on the back but this ought to be immaterial. The agreed
statement of facts had the following: "It is appellant's custom to
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are some cases which, in suggesting an exception to the rule of
Price v. NeaI if the person whom the bank has paid dealt with
the forger or, as it is said, was in a better position than the
drawee to discover the forgery, say that the indorsement of the
recipient-holder operated to lull the drawee into security, or even
as a warranty of payment 4 But it is clear that-however sustainable the purported exception-the "indorsement" per se has
no operative effect. 95
The rule then should be so stated. not only is parol evidence
require persons who present a check for payment to indorse the same
for the purpose of holding them for the draft or check." There was
likewise evidence of a previous requirement in similar situations that
the customer-plaintiff "guarantee" the bank against loss. The decision
must be justified if at all only on the court's statement that "under
amounted to a
the indorsement
the peculiar facts in this case
contract to indemnify the bank in case Greene [the drawer] failed to
pay 94
the check."
First Nat'l Bank of Crawfordsville v. First Nat'l Bank of Lafayette (1891) 4 Ind. App. 355; Ellis & Morton v. Ohio Life Ins. Co.,
(1855) 4 Ohio 628; Williamsburgh Trust Co. v. Turn Suden, (1907),
120 App. Div. 518. 105 N. Y. S. 335; Danvers Bank v. Salem Bank,
(1890) 151 Mass. 280, 24 N. E. 44. In the last case the court said
(284) that the holder bank having written "for deposit to credit" above
its own name, "the indorsement, which was not necessary to the
transfer of the check, was a guaranty of the signature of the drawer,
and the plaintiff had a right to believe that the indorser was known
to the defendant by proper inquiry."

See (1908) 56 U. of P L. Rev. 122, annotating Williamsburgh
Trust Co. v. Turn Suden, (1907) 120 App. Div. 518, 105 N. Y. S.335.
Cf., on identification, Farmers & Merchants Bk. v. Bank of
Rutherford, (1905) 115 Tenn. 64, 88 S. W 939.
95One must note some cases under sec. 60 of the English Bills of
Exchange Act, 1882, or its antecedent, 16 & 17 Vict. ch. 59, sec. 19, and

the replicas in the other British acts. That section provides: "When
a bill payable to order or demand is drawn on a banker, and the
banker on whom it is drawn pays the bill in good faith and in the
ordinary course of business, it is not incumbent on the banker to show
that the indorsement of the payee or any subsequent indorsement was
made by or under the authority of the person whose indorsement it
purports to be, and the banker is deemed to have paid the bill in due
course, although such indorsement has been forged or made without
authority." The cases involve actions by holders against drawee banks in
trover for conversion. It appears that if the person presenting for payment
purported to be -an indorsee under an indorsement in fact forged, then
-he bank is protected, but the mere receipt-indorsement is not such
a one as will protect the bank. Hare v. Copland, (1862) 13 Ir. C. L.
426; Nat'l Bank of S. Africa v. Paterson, (1909) T. S. S. Afr. 322;
Smith v. Comm'l Bking Co., (1910) 11 C. L. R. (Austr.) 667. But
see the confused opinion in Charles v. Blackwell, (1877) L. R. 2
C. P. D. 151 and Cookson v. Bank of England, (1900) 1 Paget, Legal
Decisions affecting Bankers 2. Still, Hare v. Copland, (1862) 13
Ir. C. L. 426 may actually be interpreting the statute to cover any
case where the holder "indorses" though only by way of receipt.
-See also Russell & Edwards, Australian Bills of Exchange Act 177185. Cf. Paget, Banking, 3rd ed., 134-135.
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admissible to show that no liability as an indorser was contemplated, but there is not even a presumption of liability similar to
that ansing upon a transfer indorsement.
POSSIBLE RULES OF IDENTIFIER'S LIABILITY ON SIGNATURE IN
BLANK

But how distinguish the case of the blank receipt-indorsement from the case of the blank identification indorsement? Better, will courts, generally, distinguish between these two cases,
and if they will, how? The possibilities are chiefly three. Each of
them was presented in turn by -the three decided cases which were
referred to a few paragraphs back. One, it may be said that to
avoid the confusion that existed before the Negotiable Instruments
Law in regard to the liability of the irregular indorser, the liability of the identifier shall be that of an indorser and parol evidence shall not be admitted to vary that liability Two, as another echo of the pre-negotiable instruments law age, the signature
may be made substantially nugatory the existence vel non and
the scope of liability shall be wholly a matter of proof. Three,
there shall be indulged a rebuttable presumption of liability To
predict with confidence which of these possibilities will be chosen,
it is more important to explore the considerations which may
j ustify, in the minds of the judicial lawmakers, the rule finally
definitely determined upon.
That rule will no doubt be conceived in beliefs as to convenience of administration, coincidence with the expectations of
the largest portion of individual human beings affected, and conformity to standards of decency and justice. 96 Waiving again the
important question of the applicability of the statute of frauds 1 we
may say that if the evidence of which judges sitting in judgment
were aware, by suggestion of counsel, by proof at trial or by personal knowledge, showed that in the greatest number of cases
the liability which was expected both by identifier and by bank
was that of an indorser in the sense that the liability imposed
was to be in all relevant aspects the same as that imposed in con96

1See

supra, p. 299.

97 t would probably be no defense.

The argument for its applicability would particularly be insufficiency of memorandum since it
would need parol evidence to explain the meaning of this blank
signature which clearly does not have the meaning attached to a
regular or irregular indorsement. If the liability attached be that of
an indorser, there would be no question. For the general argument for
the applicability see supra, note 81.
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sequence of a sale with warranties, then it might be expected
that that conviction would be cast into a mold of arbitrariness
(i.e., a rule of substantive law) or into a mold of presumption.
Whether the rule were one of arbitrariness or presumption would
in turn depend on the ratio of frequency of the bargain and the
difficulties of admimstration of a rule of presumption merely.
On the other hand, if the evidence showed a considerable diversity
of expectations, then the signature would be held substantially
8
nugatory 9
The legalistics in which to express either result would not
be unconvincing. In favor of substantive liability would be the
analogy of the irregular indorser and sections 63 and 64. Admitting that section 64 does not apply in terms, it would be held
to apply "in spirit;" less emotionally, section 64 indicates, it
would be said, the policy of the legislature. The argument would
perhaps be settled with a citation of section 29, defining the liability of an accommodation indorser. In favor of the rule of
presumption it would be pointed out that the pictorial use of a
signature in blank gives rise to an inference of fact that liability
was envisaged and intended and that the relevant aspects of this
liability were expected and intended to be those of an indorser,
in the absence of rebutting circumstances the frequency of the
use of such a device and therefore the need for predictability
ought to induce the courts to prevent juries from speculating. As
before, sections 63 and 64 and 29 would be cited, and as convincing analogies. Thus also, some deference would be shown for the
argument that the signature should be nugatory. This argument,
in turn, would be that, in any dramatic sense, the signature was
dearly not an indorsement, irregular or otherwise, but was merely
a notation of some sort to whici no substantial legal consequence
should be given. If the identification "indorsement" appeared in
position and time after the receipt "indorsement," the argument
would be especially convincing. In any other event, position and
98
Expediency requires that transactions be governed by legal rules
as certain as possible; the more frequent the transaction the more

certain should the legal consequence be. Hence, substantive or arbitrary rules are wise where a transaction is almost stereotyped and
allowance of parol evidence would create administrative confusion.
In less frequently recurring situations, or in situations where parol
evidence would create less confusion, presumptions are wisely indulged in. But in other situations the matter is always one of proof.
Compare the Negotiable Instruments Law, sec. 63 with Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, sec. 56.
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time would be said to be immaterial and the whole called by the
familiar phrase, "a single transaction."
PROPHESY OF RULES TO BE ADOPTED GENERALLY IN SIGNATURE
IN BLANK FOR IDENTIFICATION

The present writer will be permitted, as he is no doubt expected, to become oracular in response to the excitation of data
no more before him than before the reader. It would seem that
the evidence yielded by the inquiry among bankers and the existing legal devices of motivation and expression together indicate at the furthest a probability of the prevalence of a presumption. This presumption, to state it more definitely, would not be
of a grant to the bank of a privilege of recourse if the drawer's
account be insufficient or the drawer's signature forged. That
would be an extreme at which courts would not, generally, wish
to arrive, too weighty are the considerations which appear to
them to justify the continuance of the rule of Oddie v. National
City Bank99 and Prxe v. Ned. The presumption would, however, be of an assumption by the identifier of absolute liability
if the party identified should turn out for any reason not to have
been the party entitled to payment, or if the check be altered,
or if it be otherwise not debitable to the amount, at least, in which
payment was made by the bank. 100 If parol evidence were offered, indicating that the signatory was made to understand by
words or conduct that his signature was merely a memorial of
the fact that he was to assume a different or lesser liability, such
evidence would be admissible. If no other evidence were offered,
the presumption would operate in the usual way, in favor of
the bank. Laymen would not be startled, for their experience
would indicate rough coincidence with general understanding.
The fact that it was not always clear just what liability was
assumed would .not be disconcerting. The fact that the identifier
is usually required to be a customer or a person of some financial
responsibility and the -fact that the signature is required and oral
identification not regarded as sufficient would, to mention a few
considerations, be called to mind as indicating circumstances which
would put the identifier on notice that those consequences might
ensue which did, in the event, ensue.
99
Supra,
0

note 84.
20 1n analogy to sec. 124 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
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Yet it is not at all improbable that no presumption whatever
would be indulged in. The liability of the identifier would be
simply what the evidence disclosed. The mf~erence would then be
one of an assurance by the identifier that the person identified
was of the same name as the person designated by the terms of
the order in the check. Indeed, under the circumstances present
there might even be discerned a representation of belief in the
honesty and integrity of this stranger; and, at that, a belief based
on substantial foundation. If that be so, then a fortiori the similarity to blank indorsement need be no obstacle to sanctioning
its employment to memorialize identification. 101
Certainly, it is submitted-and at the risk of repetition-the
Negotiable Instruments Law compels no single result. The argument may be made that sec. 63 and sec. 64 are not interdependent
but coirdinate and 63 relates precisely to a case such as the one
in hand. But-it seems clear to the writer that internal grammatical
refutation is complete in any event. If sec. 63 imposes liability,
sec. 66 defines that liability. Sec. 66 says that "every indorser
--warrants to all subsequent holders in due course" the things
enumerated. A drawee bank is not a holder in due course. Not
that the language of the whole section is so far encased in steel
as to be hopelessly immalleable, but to say the least it simply
requires no emotion or confusing rhetoric to see that as a matter
of grammar and in the sense taught us by the history of judicial
statutory construction the section is not inexorable. Besides, the
writer does not believe that in every case where a name appears
on a check otherwise than as drawer sec. 63 would be construed
literally to charge the signatory as, indorser. Cases may be imagined where, pictorially speaking, no reasonable man would assume a name on a check indicated an assumption of any liability.
It may be relevant to add that even the pictorial order of indorsements does not necessarily determine the order of liability. Furthermore, we get into the whole problem of recovery back of
payments made, the same problem in which we became entangled
when commentators sought to inject Price v. Neal into the Act.
The theory of recovery back is often said to be that of unjust
enrichment. If the signatory in our case has not been enriched
101
There is no need in this article to go further into the question
of which of these two results most courts would (i. e., should) reach.
If, as appears to be frequently the case, there is little special conversation and the identifier is merely told to write his name under the name
of the person receiving payment, there ought to be no case for the
jury and consequences should be imposed by the court.
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(and he has not), on what basis allow recovery? If allowed at
all, recovery must be on contract notions, or it must be on a notion bearing only some resemblance to the unjust enrichment
born in equity, in effect, it must be based on the understanding
of the lay world which is by some called at times the uncodified
portion of the law of bills and notes, or even the law merchant.
In other words, the courts have law to make, not to apply 102
EFFECT OF SIGNATURE IN BLANK FOR IDENTIFICATION OR RECEIPT
IN

CASE OF REISSUE

We seem, then, to have considered and disposed of the problems of the scope of liability Imposed on the identifier and the
recipient of payment who memorialize their role by signature in
blank. One problem we have not in fact disposed of. The problem is raised by the argument that the form of the blank indorsement subjects the signatory, whether in the first instance for identification or for receipt, to liability to a holder in due course in case
of subsequent reissue. The argument has little to support it. The
evidence at hand, it may be said, indicates that reissue, whether
the reissue be wilful or accidental, is an occurrence of almost
negligible frequency 103 Yet, if it be a risk, there would be no
reason for giving sanction unnecessarily to a requirement that
the signature be in blank. But the fact is that the existing legal
authority-however strong the practical arguments to the contrary may be-is definitely to the effect that the check becomes
functus officio by payment, subject to no possibility of resurrection
as against any person whose name appears thereon without his
0 4

assent to that resurrection.1

102AII this serves likewise to indicate that the word "identifier"
may describe in the practice of laymen and in the meaning of the
judicial opinions any, some, or all of a number of things: to wit, a representor of acquaintance under the name indicated on the instrument
or otherwise, a promisor of a promise to make whole in case of loss
incurred through payment to a person in fact not designated by the
terms of the instrument or otherwise, or a promisor of a promise to
make whole in case of loss incurred for any reason-alteration, insolvency
or what not.
103 Only ten answers were received to the effect that such cases had
occurred in the experience of the bank. It may, however, be that
cases occur but are not brought to the attention of superior officers.
One Boston bank officer, for instance, answers that it occurs once or
twice a year, while an officer of another Boston bank can recall no

instance in forty years.

A few say "rarely" or "very seldom."

Definite

instances stated do not go beyond one or two cases in very many
years.04
2 Aurora State Bk. v. Hayes-Eames Elevator Co., (1911) 88 Neb.
187 129 N. W 279; Balsam v. Mutual Alliance T. Co., (1911) 74
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Reissue in the case at hand, one should take care to note, involves in important aspects considerations different from reissue
in other cases. The case at hand supposes actual payment in whatever form agreed upon and a reissue subsequent to the surrender
of the check to the drawee.105
Misc. Rep. 465, 132 N. Y. S. 325; Silverman v. Nat'l Bank & D. Bank,
(1906) 50 Misc. Rep. 169, 98 N. Y. S. 209; Gerlach v. North Tex. &
S. F Ry., (Tex. Civ. App. 1922) 244 S. W 662.
In the Gerlach Case the plaintiff attempted to sue as a holder in
due course of a bill of exchange, the defendant being the drawer. In
the other cases, which involved checks, the plaintiff was not a holder in
due course. But the notion underlying all is that payment "extinguishes" the instrument.
loiCases not at hand would be, chiefly, mail and clearing house
presentations in which payment and surrender of the instrument are
not in fact conditions concurrent As for the case at hand, it is at
least foreclosed by negotiable instruments law, sec. 119 (1) which
provides that "a negotiable instrument is discharged by payment in
due course by or on behalf of the principal debtor." Nevertheless, it
must be admitted that the problem still exists if the holder in counterpresentation allows the teller to hold the check before the payment
is actually made. Indeed, this is probably the usual practice, though
it may not be strictly a legal necessity, for sufficient reasons. Suppose
in this interval the check is blown out of the window or pilfered or
stolen and then comes into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value?
If the holder has placed his signature on the check beforehand and the
check is lost or stolen before delivery to the designated official of
the bank, one might say that the contingency is of no concern to us
because proper care by the holder might prevent such loss. But when
the check has been safely delivered over, payment has in fact not been
made. It is submitted that still the result reached by a court faced with
the case would be in favor of the receipt-indorser. The reason given
would no doubt be that immediately on delivery to the drawee the
instrument became a voucher, the bank probably being under a duty
to the holder to pay the amount of the check. This duty would be
called, for relevant purposes, the equivalent of payment. The weaker
argument would, of course, be that in no case could liability be imposed
on the receipt-indorser because the signature was not made "amimo
indorsandi;" as to sec. 63, that is plainly to be understood as applicable
to situations where the dramatic context indicates a transaction of credit
of some sort. the only purpose of the section being to avoid the difficulties of the irregular indorser. Not much of a reason perhaps, but
it is still a manifestation of an attitude that it is most improbable in
any event that reissue will be made; most checks are in fact eventually
cancelled; the holder can hardly be expected to cancel the check himself or to supervise its cancellation, and a rule of law which compelled
such conduct would be purest legislation. Far better to put the
occasional loss on the holder in due course.

The evidence indicates that there is room enough for reissue.

In case of counter presentation, in many banks the paying teller
stamps-the check "cashed" or "paid" and likewise his identifying
number. In others, however, the teller may put merely his number,
while in others still no mark whatever is placed on the check. In a
large number-probably most-banks, apparently, the check is placed on
a spindle so that in any event a later purchaser would have some notice
of payment (but see Ingraham v. Primrose, (1899) 7 C. B. (N.S.) 82.
In case of other presentation in most banks no notation whatever is
made on checks till after all entries are completed. Finally, all checks
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THE THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE STATED

We have now really walked around the walls of Jericho
seven times. The sum of our inquiry and our thesis, we may
safely state, it seems, in the form of conclusions (knowing full
It is as good a
well that they are of course only predictions)
way as any We note in anticipation that there seems to be no
sufficient reason for supposing a different rule as between holder
and drawer than between drawer and bank.10 6 Therefore our conclusions may be taken as applicable to both, though primarily to
the latter.
The Premises.-The thesis as it touches identification radiates from a central proposition. That proposition is that a bank
is under a duty to pay the holder if he is sufficiently identified.
Where the holder is known to the bank it is immaterial that he
be a pauper or a thief-the bank must pay the order. It would be
immaterial that recourse for payment on a possible but not probable alteration or insufficiency of account of the drawer or any
other reason (assuming recourse to be at all possible by virtue
of stipulation, statute or otherwise) might be unavailing against
him. If the bank demands from the holder a security of reimbursement, it acts at its peril. Therefore, it follows, the drawer
is barred from suit for dishonor only where the holder's identity
is not sufficiently established. If holders had to satisfy such conditions, they might never get payment or only at the expense
however presented after having been entered are cancelled, usually
today-by perforations. This cancellation may occur the same day
(in most of the larger banks) or the next day, so that a considerable
time elapses between receipt by the bank and cancellation. In addition,
a considerable number of persons have access to the place where the
checks are kept, pending cancellation. In the larger bank today, however, there is some minimization of risk by the division of bookkeeping
labor and therefore facility in detecting at what point in the process of
transmission of the check in question it was lost or abstracted. In any
case, policy dictates that the loss if any, should be on the bank. But
the solution is either a fiction or an action for tort. The drawer-with
whom we do not deal-is not to be charged; nor the receipt-indorser.
If there is no remedy, the new holder must shoulder the loss. It
should be noted that in the process before "payment" numerous notations and so forth may put a subsequent purchaser on notice however
the check is presented.
See I Morse, Banks and Banking, 5th ed., 7011, 2 Paton, Digest
1923.
1OThere are in effect two sanctions: the drawer's action against
the bank and the holder's against the drawer. If the holder sues the
drawer and recovers, the drawer will retaliate by suing the bank and
recovering damages or will, in any event, discontinue business or use
other non-legal devices of revenge. So that ultimately the bank will
be forced to rue in some way the conduct which the courts frown upon.
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of a bond or a fee. Tins proposition, however, is not undebatable.
the greater the liability imposed on the identifier, the more circumspectly the identification will be made. The rule which compels the bank to pay paupers and thieves is a harsh one on banks
and should be limited, in any event, paupers and thieves known
to the bank may be more easily pursued when necessary than
paupers and thieves who are strangers. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the courts of this country, faced with the necessity of
making a decision, would begin with the proposition with which
107
this paragraph begins
As the thesis touches receipt, the contention is that in the
jurisdictions having either of the Field provisions it would be
held that the case in hand falls within the express terms of the
statute.01
In those, jurisdictions in which the statutes are in
terms limited to tender it would be held that in effect the situation which it was intended to cover is no different from that of
either of the Field provisions."°9 Where no statutory provision
is to be found-that is, in most jurisdictions-the force of these
statutes, common decency and the absence of any formidable legal
barrier in precedent would compel the same decision. 120
2°7Hunt, Tender, sec. 246, says the same. In England and the
Empire, however, in spite of Chalmers' obscurity, the effect of the
Bills of Exchange Act section referred to supra, note 95, may be to
compel the bank to pay a check at least when presented by someone not
purporting to be the payee, simply because of the protection given the
bank, should the recipient turn out not to have been entitled to payment.
Even this, however, seems doubtful; if a banker has enough of the
milk of human kindness, for the interest of the drawer or a prior party.
to make hum hesitate to pay, one would imagine it immoral to cast
up the privilege to pay and debit Practically speaking, however, the
drawer who will sue for dishonor will probably often have ground, or
will think he has ground, for believing the identification demand to
have 08been a device on the bank's part to avoid payment.
See Supra, p. 295. Under the Civil Code section it would be said
that the "debtor" entitled to a receipt should be taken to include the
bank, while the "creditor" means also the creditor's "agent," namely, the
holder whom the drawer-creditor has sent to receive part payment
of the bank's debt. In collateral complications, the language may be
faulty, but the statute will bear the construction. The Code of Civil
Procedure section is clearly applicable: "Whoever pays money
is entitled to a receipt therefor, from the person to whom payment
is made." Under the Civil Code section, it would be interesting to
see what disposition would be made if the bank had promised to
allow overdrawing, as is the custom in England and some of the
British
colonies.
209 These statutes, it will be recalled (supra note 54), do not limit
the sanction
to the incidence of interest and costs.
320 Brannan, in his review of Daniel referred to supra, note 91,
indicates by citation of early authors that it was long the practice for
bills of exchange to have a receipt form printed on the back. He
states that the modern blank indorsement is merely an abbreviation
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Where a check is presented for payment over the counter
at the drawee bank, the bank may demand as a condition of payment that the person making presentment identify himself as the
person entitled to receive payment by the terms of the drawer's
order 1' and that he tender a receipt of payment.
As To Recetpt.-A receipt may be demanded either by blank
indorsement or, if the holder objects, by a form "received payment" or the like written on the check. A separate sheet of paper,
unless necessary because of absence of room on the check, is
not acceptable. The possibility of loss by separation from the
check is not inconsiderable and there is really no sufficient reason
why the holder should insist on a separate sheet of paper 112 In
any event-and here there is a divergence from what may seem
to be the notion expressed in some of the cases discussed earlier
-it is not incumbent on the holder to present a reecipt as a condition precedent to payment, it is the bank which must demand it
to save itself from liability to the drawer. The reason for this is
of the older form. These authorities should prove of some value in

argument, especially since they usually state besides that the payer
is entitled to the receipt. See Swift, Digest of Evidence and Treatise
on Bills of Exchange 323; Maxwell, Bills 171, Glen, Treatise on Bills
of Exchange 163. In 59 Irish L. T. 46, it is said that there is a growing
custom for checks to be printed with a receipt form on the back. See
also Paget, Banking, 3rd ed., 120, 150-151, Sykes, Checques with Receipt
Forms Attached, 40 Journ. Inst. of Bankers 310. But this raises the
question of the effect in England of the Stamp Act; for under the
English acts dating from 43 Geo. III (126) (see Benjamin, Sales 3d ed.,
713 for history), the present act being the Stamp Act of 1891, 54 & 55
Vict. c. 39 secs. 101-103 (and amended Fin. Act 1920, 11 & 11 Geo.
V ch. 18 pt. III sec. 34 and Fin. Act 1924, 14 Geo. V, c. 2 pt. Ill
sec. 36) a debtor might demand of his creditor a stamped receipt. See
sec. 103 (2) "If any person in any case where a receipt would be liable
to duty refuses to give a receipt duly stamped
he shall incur a
fine of ten pounds." The provision, however, is limited to amounts
over £2. See Benjamin, Sales 6th ed., 896. But by Finance Act 1895
(58 & 59 Vict. ch. 16) an exemption is made so that "the name of the
payee written upon a draft or order, if payable to order shall [not] constitute a receipt chargeable with stamp duty." Formerly a "receipt
written upon a bill of exchange
duly stamped" did not require
a stamp. See Alpe, Law of Stamp Duties, 18th ed., 226. Under these
acts, to speak with circumspection, so far as a stamp is required a
receipt seems to be demandable as of right, while if the stamp is
not required, the "common law rule" of England-which is not yet
made known-applies.
"'See infra, notes 113 and 118.
-x2Of course with care such receipts would not be detached, but the
matter is of an importance too slight and the difference to the holder in
any event precisely nothing but subjective, to warrant meddling by
a court-assuming the case to come before a court. If, however, the
bank is willing to accept a detached receipt, the holder is a fortiori
under a necessity to give it and on his refusal the drawer cannot allege
a default by the bank.
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to be found in the lesser judicial insistence on a receipt as a matter of highest desirability- it is merely a matter of a mild desira113
bility but sufficient to be judicially sanctioned.
As To Identiflcation.-- The identification may be undertaken

by the bank. If so undertaken, the bank may not take an unreasonable time for the identification. This seems clear on pragmatic grounds-and it has, as has before appeared, some judicial
recognition.
The identification may be required to be offered by the person presenting. If such a requirement be made it is ordinarily
immaterial what amount the check calls for or what the practice
of the bank be ordinarily Short of express agreement, contract
notions cannot be used to spell out of evidence of past performance (such as that brought out earlier in this inquiry) that banks
distingiush large checks from small, unless the bank be shown
to be unreasonable in its requirement."'
The identification may be demanded to be made orally by a
third person known to the bank to be honest. The identification
may be in terms that the identifier has known the person presenting for payment by the name he purports to bear. It may be in
terms that the identifier further has no reason to suspect that the
name by wluch the person was known to him merely happens to
be that by which the person entitled to payment is designated
by the terms of the check. The honesty of the identifier may be
required to be in actual reputation or as an inference from financial position. If the identifier be a customer of the bank, that
will obviously be sufficient. Again it is submitted that satisfactory identication suffices, therefore it is not necessary that
the identifier be a customer-to say the least, a customer may
not be numbered among the holder's acquaintances."' 5 Further,
" 3 This would seem to be the line of demarcation between conditions where performance is waived by failure to make affirmative insistence that they be performed and conditions which are not waived
unless their performance is affirmatively dispensed with. Both identification and receipt, it is submitted, belong to the first class.
To the effect that a receipt need not be made in any event till
surrender for payment, see Neale v. Balinski, [1910] 1 C. P D. (S.
Afr.) 350.
124 The mere fact that banks do not ask for identification is, it
is submitted, no ground for refusing a privilege to decline payment
when the penalty may be inability to debit. Not all expectations.
though they be based on most reasonable grounds, are to be enforced
by the courts, current over-generalization to the contrary notwithstanding.
215 1t would be-an undue burden on liquidation processes if holders
of checks had perforce to be limited either to customers of the drawee

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

the bank may require that the identifier make his identification
in writing. The argument for the writing is founded on considerations of convenience of proof and record. But the bank may
not insist that the identifier also represent that the holder is an
honest person or solvent. If, to repeat once again, the bank knew
the drawer to have designated or a transfer of the check to have
been made to a dishonest or insolvent person, it must be none the
less under a duty to honor.
Similarly, if the identifier or the presenter for him offers,
and the bank refuses, a written identification in terms instead of
a signature in blank;16 or if he refuses the bank's demand that
the blank indorsement be understood as a memorial of guarantee
in the sense of assumption of risk of contingencies other then
deliberate falsehood or, perhaps, negligent representation of belief in the identity of the presenter-the bank will be considered
in breach of its obligation to the drawer. The mere fact that the
holder may not be known to the drawer is no reason for demanding the performance of conditions to the payment which the bank
as an institution is obligated to make. Therefore if the bank demands an identification in blank and nothing is said as to liability
and the identifier demurs, it is for the bank to ask for a qualified
form restricting liability merely to identification. The possibility that
a court might reach a rule of presumption of liability as an indorser and therefore the justifiable fear of the identifier or of the
holder who may have to give the identifier a bond or pay him a
fee to secure the identification, is too great a burden to impose
on the drawer who seeks to liquidate his debts by a proper use of
the banking institution. At least, since the chiefly available legal
device of imposing direct sanctions on the commercial bank is
banks or to persons having friends who are customers of the drawee

banks and at the same time gracious, or to persons able and willing to
postpone payment till clearance could be effected through a bank.
When one considers the privilege of the drawer to stop payment to
disable the bank from debiting on payment and the disability of the
holder from suing the bank for the amount of the check, little doubt
seems to remain of the probability that the proposition in the text will
receive general approbation. Add to this the possibility suggested that
holders would be compelled to pay persons fees for identificationunless they had had the foresight or bargaining power to secure from
the drawer some notification to the bank waiving identification. The
notification would have to be separate since otherwise the check might
in substance become payable to bearer.
heIn this case there is no absolute necessity that this be written
on the check, but the identifier would have no valid reason for
refusing to write on the check.
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the drawer's action, the drawer should be allowed the action. " 7
In fact, the same should be true even where the bank demands the
legend. "identification guaranteed," if what is forthcoming is.
"for identification only," or a legend of similar import. In any
event, identification is neither procedurally nor substantively an
absolute condition precedent to the bank's liability for dishonor"
it is a condition only when the bank demands its performance."6
Of course, if pnor decision has already defined the content of the
identifier-indorser's liability to be larger than mere identification,
the consequence as between drawer and bank follows a fortiori.
THE SUM AND SUBSTANCE
But suppose, says the reader, these rules are in fact applied by
the courts-how effectively will the conduct be enforced which is
set up as a standard? The allowing of an action by the drawer for
the amount of the check as upon a sufficient demand, the award of
interest, perhaps, and costs-these are picayune sanctions.
Whether the heavy penalty for injury to credit will be awarded is
at least doubtful, 19 he will add. If only nominal damages be recbvered, under state statutes perhaps even costs will not be awarded the customer. 20 Legally right or legally wrong, the fact is that
"'7This is not the place for examining de novo the considerations
which justify denying the holder of a check an action against the
bank. The writer believes, if his belief is worth communicating, that
such an action ought to be allowed. But our economic organization
dovetails
smoothly enough with the present rule.
118 This was the holding in Levy v. Commercial T. Co., (1915) 156
N. Y. S. 295, which is the only case found involving in some way the
necessity of identification so far as concerns the drawer's claims against
the bank. The plaintiff, it may seem worth noting, did not ask for
damages for injury to credit but merely counted as on a demand
sufficient to allow an action for the amount of the check and incidentally
interest
and costs.
219 The cases on the measure of damages, for dishonor give no clear
answer to this crucial and highly interesting question. There seems,
however, to be sufficient indication in the approach of some courts that
damages for injury to credit are not imposed for defamation but for
failure to perform the function which the commercial bank assumes
to perform for its customers. See, e.g., McFall v. First Nat'l Bank.
(1919) 138 Ark. 370, 211 S. W 919, and First Nat'l Bank v. McFall.
(1920) 144 Ark. 149, 222 S. W 40; J. M. James & Co. v. Bank, (1900)
105 Tenn. 1, 58 S. W 261, Weiner v. N. Penn. Bank. (1916) 65 Pa.
Super.
290.
120 See e.g., N. Y. Mun. Ct. Code secs. 164, 170; 27 Col. L. Rev.
974.
"'2In addition to checks, notes and acceptances payable at a bank
are also transfer devices of deposit currency; and, of course, It Is
possible to have oral orders on a bank as transfer devices. These other
devices, however, have not been discussed here: first, because they are
practically of much less importance, and secondly, because the duty
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banks do succeed in securing blank indorsements or guarantees far
beyond what they seem to be entitled to receive. To tell the truth,
1 21
the present writer is constrained to agree.

of a commercial bank to honor any of these other devices without
express assumption is, in the case of the note and acceptance, an
unsettled point, and in the case of the oral order, decided in favor of
the bank. Oral orders are properly freaks and wholly pathological;
that there is no duty to honor them consult: First Nat'l Bank) v.
Stapf, (1905) 165 Md. 162, 74 N. E. 987 Wasserstrom v. Pub. Bank.
(1910) 123 N. Y. S. 55" Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Dils, (1897) 18 Ind. App.
319, 48 N. E. 19; Harding v. Pen Argyle Nat'l Bank, (1917) 67 Pa.
Super. 68, McEwen v. Davis, (1872) 39 Ind. 109; see Watts v. Christie,
(1849) 11 Beav. 546, 551. The N. I. L. sec. 87 says that an instrument
made payable at a bank is equivalent to an order to the bank to pay
the same for the account of the principal debtor thereon, assuming the
section has any proper application to relations between bank and
maker or acceptor (as to which see supra note 6), the effect of it is
simply to privilege the bank to debit if it pays, as on a payment at
request, non constat that the bank was under a duty to pay. A duty
was assumed in Dirnfeld v. 14th St. Savings Bk., (1911) 37 App. D. C.
11, and in Clark Co. v. Mt. Morris Bk., (1903) 85 App Div. 362, 83
N. Y. S. 447, aff'd 181 N. Y. 533. 73 N. E. 1133, and in Brooke v.
Tradesmen's Nat'l Bank, (1893) 69 Hun 202, 23 N. Y S. 802 (before

N. I. L.).

In Australia, where there is no statutory equivalent to

N. I. L. sec. 87, it is assumed there is a duty growing out of practice.
See, e.g., Russell & Edwards, Banker and Customer in Australia 207
In this country however, not only is sec. 87 of the N. I. L. deleted %,
modified or even reversed in terms in some states (see annotation in
Brannan's N. I. L. under sec. 87) but even in those states where the
section is in force the returns to questionnaires indicate that banks will
refuse to pay a note or acceptance made payable at the respective
banking houses by customers unless expressly requested by the customer to pay. Even where the bank calls up and asks whether payment
should be made. the customer is requested to pay by check first. In
any event, in spite or regardless of the more extensive use of the trade
acceptance today, in very few parts of the country are notes or acceptances made payable at a bank presented over the counter. If the bank
is not the holder at maturity, it receives it for collection through the
mails or through the clearing house. In those rare instances, however.
when counter presentation is made, the same procedure is followed as
in checks; indeed, the procedure will probably be distinguished by
greater circumspectness since amounts involved are greater and defenses more apt to exist than in checks-defenses even as between
maker or acceptor and payee.

